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ABSTRACT 
While the Brown V. Board of Education case is constantly referenced when discussing 
educational equity and desegregation, Bolling v. Sharpe stands as another important education 
civil rights case and is perhaps more telling of the story of education in the United States. Bolling 
V. Sharpe was argued and decided in the United States Supreme Court over the course of 1952 to 
1954. Similar to Brown v. Board in terms of intent, Bolling v. Sharpe aimed to desegregate 
public schools in Washington, D.C. in order to give African-American students equal access to a 
high quality public education on par with that of their white peers. This historical study will 
examine the factors that led to the case of Bolling v. Sharpe, analyze the cases intended impact 
and discuss the factors that led to its ultimate failure. Bolling v. Sharpe intended to end 
segregation for African-American students in D.C. public schools, and the larger African-
American and civil rights communities perceived the verdict as a victory. However, the court 
ruling itself could not undo decades of systemic racism, and could not account for the de facto 
segregation that Washington, D.C. would endure over the course of twenty years in relation to 
social and economic policies. Despite civil rights leader’s best efforts, de facto segregation 
replaced de jure segregation, and the cities African-American student population still lagged 
behind their white peers academically and socially. Socio-economic conditions and the historical 
context of race in D.C. has stifled the academic achievement of African-American students in 
Washington D.C, leaving a much more complicated legacy of Bolling v. Sharpe than many 
would like to acknowledge.  
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“If a race has no history, if it has no worthwhile tradition, it becomes a negligible factor in the 
thought of the world, and it stands in danger of being exterminated” 
 
Carter G. Woodson  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
~ 
 
Dedicated to all the black and brown kids fighting a world desperately trying to build barriers 
fast enough to keep us down – as we tear those same barriers down vigorously and burn them 
down with fire lighting our path along the way. This is for all the dreamers, the misfits, the high 
school drop-outs, the wayward sons and daughters of America and for all of those who dedicated 
their lives to the struggle for freedom and equality in the District of Columbia.  
 
~ 
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A Note on Language and Terminology 
 
When writing about race in the context of history – especially education history given its 
racially motivated divisive past – it is important to be intentional about language. In this analysis 
I will use the words black and African-American interchangeably to refer to people who are non-
white and of African descent. I will also intentionally use the terminology Negro in some 
instances (instead of black or African-American) outside of a historical setting or quotation. An 
example of such is the title of Chapter 3 “The Negro Children,” where I also make it a point 
throughout the chapter to use Negro when referring to black students in D.C. Public Schools.  
Using such language does not come without controversy, so I want to address my reasoning for 
using the word Negro in a colloquial, academic context in the year 2016.  
For many throughout the years the term Negro has been viewed as a derogatory term, 
closely related to the epithet of Nigger. Negro was also the common word used in the everyday 
vernacular of white and black people alike throughout the early 1900’s, into the 1960’s to refer 
to African-American people. I use the word Negro now to make a point; a point that while 
African-Americans were looked down upon, and forced to face the realities of both de facto and 
de jure segregation in schools, they were also strong, brave and overcame many obstacles along 
the way. I use the word Negro in the spirit of reclaiming language, as American feminist scholar 
Adrienne Rich states “This is the oppressor’s languages yet I need it to talk to you,” and Black 
feminist scholar bell hooks cites in an essay centered around that very quote in Teaching to 
Transgress that “Reflecting on Adrienne Rich’s words, I know that it is not the English language 
that hurts me, but what the oppressors do with it, how they shape it to become a territory that 
limits and defines, how they make it a weapon that can shame, humiliate, colonize.” I am using 
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the word Negro to reclaim it from the oppressor, the oppressor who throughout history worked to 
make the word synonyms with feelings of inferiority and worthlessness. I am using it to redefine 
power and strength behind the term. W.E.B. Dubois in his 1928 essay titled The Name “Negro” 
shares this spirit of using the word Negro as he writes: 
 
"Negro" is a fine word. Etymologically and phonetically it is much better and more 
logical than "African" or "colored" or any of the various hyphenated circumlocution. 
 
I hope this note makes my intentions clear. I do not use the word in ill will, and I believe it adds 
value to the overall analysis and argument that I make. It is a strong word, fitting for a strong, 
complicated story.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction: The Landscape of the Capital & Segregation in the United States 
Gardner Bishop left his small, rural hometown of Rocky Mount, North Carolina in 1930,1 
becoming one of the tens of thousands of African-Americans who fled the Deep South, heading 
further North to Washington, D.C. during the Great Migration. He was an honest, hard working 
family man, who was known for his sharp, witty temperament and ill will towards racially 
motivated injustice.2 Bishop came to the nation’s capital in hopes of escaping the stifling laws 
and customs of the Jim Crow South in order to provide a more just life for himself, his wife and 
his three kids – Judine, Anita and Gardner Bishop Jr. However, upon his arrival in the District of 
Columbia, Bishop and his family soon learned that leaving the Deep South did not mean 
escaping the restrictive laws and social hardships of Jim Crow.  
Despite Washington, D.C.’s reputation as the center of American democracy and 
freedom, and the place that nurtured and created some of the finest African-American minds in 
law, public service and education including – Carter G. Woodson, Thurgood Marshall and 
Eleanor Holmes Norton – the city remained deeply entrenched in segregationalist policies, 
ideology, and racial prejudice against African-Americans. Gardner Bishop could not escape 
racial prejudice in Washington D.C. because the nation’s capital was a city built off racial 
inequality just as much as Rocky Mount, North Carolina was. The seeds of racial disparities 
between African-American and white residents were planted in Washington, D.C. from the 
District’s inception as a territory in 1790,3 and made more complicated by the District’s standing 
as territory, rather than a state. After the United States Congress made the District its official 
                                                        
1 J.Y., Smith, “The Obituary of Gardner L. Bishop.” The Washington Post. November 27, 1992. Accessed December 
1, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1992/11/27/obituaries/8941c815-c03b-4eb7-80b0-
ef4a3b7f3947/. 
2 Ibid,. 
3 Peter Irons, “Jim Crows Children: The Broken Promise of the Brown Decision” (New York, NY, Penguin Books, 
2004), 97. 
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home in 1800, local government was established with a mayor and the Board of Aldermen.4 It 
was also decided that the laws of the neighboring state of Maryland, including the slave laws, 
would apply to D.C. as well.5 In addition to the local government, Congress took the role of 
overseeing the laws and regulations of the District of Columbia, despite the fact that District 
residents did not have voting representation in Congress. Because D.C. was a territory subjected 
too Congressional oversight, and because D.C. enforced  Maryland’s laws, including its slave 
laws, black residents had little autonomy over their own government and almost no 
representation.  
Washington, D.C.’s history as a southern city both in geography – as it sits below the 
Mason-Dixon Line – and in social structure upheld a culture that consigned African-American 
residents to second-class citizenship. This contributed to the unfavorable conditions faced by 
Bishop and his parent group. The District’s ties to southern culture include its own history with 
chattel slavery, and the creation and implementation of the Black Codes, which were meant to 
further suppress the rights of African-Americans in nineteenth century Washington, D.C. By 
1800, African-Americans made up a quarter of Washington, D.C.’s population, and fear arose 
amongst pro-slavery, white legislators that the population of free African-Americans would 
continue to rise.6 As a response to the growing fear, Washington mayor Robert Brent and the 
Board of Alderman established the Black Codes in 1808.7 Mayor Brent, the Board of Alderman 
and other white pro-slavery legislators hoped that the Black Codes would deter free African-
                                                        
4 The Board of Alderman was the precursor to the Council of the District of Columbia 
(http://emancipation.dc.gov/page/ending-slavery-district-columbia). 
5 "Slavery in the Capital (Memory): American Treasures of the Library of Congress." Slavery in the Capital 
(Memory): American Treasures of the Library of Congress. July 27, 2010. Accessed March 15, 2016. 
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm009.html.  
6 "Ending Slavery In The District of Columbia." DC.gov. Accessed March 15, 2016. 
http://emancipation.dc.gov/page/ending-slavery-district-columbia.  
7 Ibid,. 
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Americans, and runaway enslaved black people, from migrating to the nation’s capital while 
simultaneously further suppressing the rights of African-Americans already living in the city.8 
The Black Codes succeeded in worsening the quality of life for African-Americans in 
Washington, D.C., as their socio-economic, political and living conditions deteriorated 
throughout the first forty years of the nineteenth century. 
In 1835, the population of Washington, D.C. was approximately 21,000 people.9 Just 
over a quarter of those residents were African-American, with roughly one-third of the African-
American population being enslaved people and the remaining two-thirds free.10 Despite the 
seemingly low number of enslaved black people in the District (in comparison to the rest of the 
South), conditions were so poor for African-Americans in the city that an 1836 broadside called 
the capital city the “Slave Market of America.”11 The two-thirds of the population that were “free 
blacks” were required to register with the city, and have a white person bear witness to their 
registration by verifying that they [the freed black person] was not enslaved.12 The entrenchment 
of slave culture and the Black Codes in Washington, D.C. were seen in the lived experience of 
Nancy Jones. In 1835, she was walking down the street and was stopped by a police officer that 
then asked her to produce her papers proving she was free. Nancy was indeed a free black young 
woman, and had never been enslaved, but she did not have the papers necessary to prove such 
and was subsequently arrested and deemed a “runaway slave.”13 Jones’s story was not one that 
                                                        
8 Ibid., 
9 The population of DC in 1835 did not include Georgetown, which at the time was its own separate city 
10 Pulliam, Ted “The Dark Days of the Black Codes; Court records detail perils even free blacks faced in 
Washington, D.C. in 1835.” Accessed November 1, 2015. http://dcchs.org/Articles/blackcodes.pdf.  
11 Masur, Kate “Washington’s Black Codes,” The New York Times. December 7, 2011. Accessed December 17, 
2015. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/washingtons-black-codes/. 
12 Alison Stewart, “First Class: The Legacy of Dunbar, America’s First Black Public High School” (Chicago, IL, 
Lawrence Hill Books, 2013), 10. 
13 Pulliam, Ted “The Dark Days of the Black Codes; Court records detail perils even free blacks faced in 
Washington, D.C. in 1835.” Accessed November 1, 2015. http://dcchs.org/Articles/blackcodes.pdf. 
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was unique for the time; the law made clear that “every Negro and mulatto found residing in the 
city” who could not “establish his or her title to freedom” would be jailed “as absconding 
slaves.”14 African-Americans had to fact the harsh and unjust realities of the Black Codes on a 
daily basis, dealing with the constant threat that white officer could stop and arrest them for 
committing no apparent crime. The Black Codes as a whole restricted where African-American 
D.C. residents could live, exiling them from certain neighborhoods and determining what jobs 
they could hold. This segregation meant that African-Americans often held menial jobs and 
received menial wages.15 Additionally, the Black Codes established strict curfews that African-
Americans were forced to abide by, or risk arrest if they were caught outside after curfew. 
In 1862 – a year after the start of the American Civil War – enslaved African-Americans 
in Washington, D.C. got some relief from their oppression. On April 16th, 1862, President 
Abraham Lincoln signed the Compensated Emancipation Act, formally ending slavery for the 
estimated thirty-one hundred enslaved blacks in Washington, D.C.16 While they made up a small 
percentage of the four million enslaved black people across the country, the emancipation of 
D.C.’s enslaved people set the stage for Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation address which he 
would give nine months later. Nonetheless even if formerly enslaved black people had their 
“freedom,” they still had to follow the restrictions placed on them by the Black Codes. Like their 
free peers, they still had to live in the reality of second-class citizenship.  
 
 
                                                        
14 Masur, Kate “Washington’s Black Codes,” The New York Times. December 7, 2011. Accessed December 17, 
2015. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/washingtons-black-codes/. 
15 Alison Stewart, “First Class: The Legacy of Dunbar, America’s First Black Public High School” (Chicago, IL, 
Lawrence Hill Books, 2013), 10. 
16 Ibid., 9 
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Building an Education System for African-Americans 
Within the historical reality of the Black Codes and chattel slavery there was a “shadow” 
education system in Washington, D.C. aimed at educating the city’s young black residents. The 
black residents of D.C. did not benefit from the 1802 charter for Washington City, which brought 
along “the establishment and superintendence of schools.”17 This declaration applied strictly to 
white students only, leaving African-Americans who wanted an education to fend for 
themselves. In 1807, a free black carpenter, George Bell, built the first schoolhouse for African-
Americans in Washington, D.C. He financed the project using funds from white abolitionists. 
The Bell School was the first in a trend of makeshift schools established by the African-
American community; many of these schools were in black churches and private homes of other 
progressive white northerners who resided in D.C. These makeshift schools served a small 
contingent of the District’s black youth and were educational spaces built in the spirit of brazen 
rebellion. They were spaces where educators were determined to teach the African-American 
students of Washington, D.C. no matter what. 
Among these progressive white northerners was Myrtilla Miner, a young Quaker, 
abolitionist woman who came from upstate New York. Miner moved to the city in order to start a 
school for colored children. Miner organized the most well-known school during these shadow 
years of education for African-American’s in D.C. She rented a room in the house of an older 
free black woman’s home, and on December 6th, 1851, and opened her school: Normal School 
for Colored Girls.18 Not only was Myrtilla Miner’s focus on teaching colored students, she 
focused on young colored girls in particular. Despite facing violence and attempts of intimidation 
                                                        
17 Mark Richards, “Public School Governance In the District of Columbia: A Timeline,” Washington History 16, no. 
2 (2004/2005): 23-25. Accessed September 9, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40073394.  
18 Alison Stewart, “First Class: The Legacy of Dunbar, America’s First Black Public High School” (Chicago, IL, 
Lawrence Hill Books, 2013), 16. 
   6
for her work, including arson and the frequent vandalism of her home/schoolhouse, Miner’s 
school was a success.19 Just six years after she first established the school, six of her former 
students went on to establish their own schools.20 Even some African-Americans could not 
believe what Miner had done. When she was originally developing her plans to start the school 
Frederick Douglas had told her that her plan was “reckless, almost to the point of madness.”21 
Miner’s success with the Normal School for Colored Girls set the precedent that it was possible 
to teach the African-American children of Washington, D.C.  
1862 was not just the year the enslaved black people of D.C. were declared free; it was 
also the year in Washington, D.C. when Congress passed legislation requiring public funding for 
schools for all free coloreds in the District.22 The law mandated that all District children ages 6-
14, black and white, were required to receive three months of education per year. For black 
school-aged children and black-serving schools this mandate meant that ten percent of taxes had 
to be collected on “negro owned property” in order to fund the education of African-American 
children.23 The law also established the Board of Trustees for Colored Students, which would 
become the District’s governing body for colored schools. The official de jure segregation of 
public schools in Washington, D.C. had begun. 
By establishing two separate school systems for black and white students, Washington, 
D.C. formalized de jure segregation and a dual system of education in 1862. The de jure 
                                                        
19 Myrtilla Miner operated her school without receiving any public funding from the District of Columbia 
government.  
20 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “Myrtilla Miner”, www.brittannica.com/EBchecked/topic/383669/Myrtilla-
Miner. 
21 Alison Stewart, “First Class: The Legacy of Dunbar, America’s First Black Public High School” (Chicago, IL, 
Lawrence Hill Books, 2013), 15. 
22 Constance McLaughlin Green, Secret City: History of Race Relations in the Nations Capital (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton Press, 1967), 47.  
23 Richards, Mark. "Public School Governance In The District of Columbia: A Timeline." Washington History 16, 
no. 2, 23-25. Accessed December 4, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40073394.  
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segregation of schools aimed to create a sense of “separate but equal” standards in American 
education. This system meant that black and white students would attend separate school 
facilities but have an “equal” quality of education. In reality “separate but equal” forced African-
American students to attend schools, which were inferior to the high quality of facilities, 
afforded to their white peers. The de jure segregated schools of Washington D.C. lasted for 
almost a century, keeping black and white students separated by order of law. This strictly 
enforced de jure segregated system of education relegated the black students of the nation’s 
capital to inadequate and inferior facilities and curricula, affording them an incomplete 
education. Alison Stewart in First Class: The Legacy of Dunbar, America’s First Black High 
School is quick to point out that African-American students “were stuffed into old abandoned 
buildings with the children practically sitting on top of one another,” textbooks were far and few 
between, and old Army barracks were even used for classroom space.24 Additionally because the 
publically-funded schools for African-Americans were such a new concept in comparison to the 
white schools, which had a sixty-year head start, the curriculum at these early all-black schools 
was not as well developed as the curriculum of the early white schools of Washington. By 1864, 
there was only one colored public school in the entirety of the District.  
The primary reasons for this lack of initial growth within black school system lay in the 
lack of strong leadership, and the dismally planned funding strategy. The 1862 law required that 
African-American schools be financed using the taxes collected from African-American 
landowners. The policy was not sustainable, given the small number of African-Americans who 
actually owned land in D.C. Furthermore when money was collected, it rarely got to the board in 
a timely fashion. In 1864 only $628 of the $25,000 set aside made it to the trustees responsible 
                                                        
24 Alison Stewart, “First Class: The Legacy of Dunbar, America’s First Black Public High School” (Chicago, IL, 
Lawrence Hill Books, 2013), 30. 
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for the all-black school system.25 Congress responded to the economic mismanagement of 
funding for black schools in Washington, D.C. by passing additional legislation, including a law 
on June 23, 1866 that required funds to be handed over to the colored trustees in a timely 
manner, or the D.C. commissioners would be punished.26 
The District of Columbia Board of Trustees for Colored Students also needed a strong, 
savvy leader in order to have any hope of improving educational quality for African-Americans 
in the city. The board found that leader in William Syphax. Syphax had strong ties to the 
Washington, D.C. community and his father had been a slave for the man who had owned the 
entirety of Arlington, Virginia. Syphax was also well educated, growing up hearing stories of 
Thomas Jefferson, George Washington and attending a private school in Arlington before going 
on to work at the Department of Interior. It was Syphax’s background, local roots, and imposing 
physical stature that made him the perfect man for the job. Under the leadership of Syphax and 
George F.T. Cook, the first superintendent of the colored schools, the number of public schools 
for African-Americans in Washington, D.C. grew to seventy-five by 1872.27 The dramatic 
growth in the overall number of public schools for African-American students included the 
opening of the first public high school for black students in the United States – The Prepatory 
High School For Colored Youth. The Prepatory High School For Colored Youth held its first 
classes on November 4, 1870 in a church basement and remained the District’s only black high 
school until 1902, when the Armstrong Manual Training School opened. The Prepatory High 
School for Colored Youth would later be renamed, first to the M Street School and then finally to 
                                                        
25 Constance McLaughlin Green, Secret City: History of Race Relations in the Nations Capital (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton Press, 1967), 69. 
26 Alison Stewart, “First Class: The Legacy of Dunbar, America’s First Black Public High School” (Chicago, IL, 
Lawrence Hill Books, 2013), 30. 
27 Annual Report of the Colored Schools In Washington & Georgetown 1871-1872: George F.T. Cook 
Superintendent, January 23, 1873. 
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Dunbar High School. The boom in schools for African-Americans came at the perfect time in the 
District, as demographics quickly shifted after the Civil War. Between 1860 and 1867, the 
number of colored people in Washington, D.C. increased 200 percent, as the Black Codes failed 
their ultimate mission of keeping out the former slaves that were heading north.28 The end of the 
Civil War also gave birth to Congresses’ Reconstruction Act, which granted the right to vote to 
African-American men in Washington, D.C.29 For a short period time, from the end of the Civil 
War until the late 1870’s, African-Americans in Washington, D.C. gained more political, social 
and economic power largely due to Reconstruction reforms. School enrollment for black students 
was also rising, with the percentage of colored students enrolled in public schools in 
Washington, D.C. reaching 18%. Some black students were so determined to get to school that 
they traveled up to two hours each way to access their schools.30  
However, by 1874 the local separate territories of Washington City, Washington County 
and Georgetown were merged to form one government and one school system, and much of the 
progress African-Americans made during the short lived period of Reconstruction was erased in 
what came to be known as the Redemption.31 Historian Rayford Logan wrote of the Redemption 
as “the last decade of the nineteenth century and the opening of the twentieth century marked the 
nadir of the Negro’s status in American society.”32  
 
 
                                                        
28 The Special Report of the Commissioner of Education, “The History of Schools For the Colored Population”. 
Volume 1, Part 1. Washington, D.C, Government Printing Office, 1896. 
29 Frederick, Rona M., and Jenice L. View. "Facing the Rising Sun: A History of Black Educators in Washington, 
DC, 1800-2008." Urban Education 44, no. 5 (September 01, 2009): 571-607. Accessed September 29, 2015. 
doi:10.1177/0042085908318779. 
30 Alison Stewart, “First Class: The Legacy of Dunbar, America’s First Black Public High School” (Chicago, IL, 
Lawrence Hill Books, 2013), 34. 
31 Ibid., 33. 
32 Ibid., 34. 
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Cementing De Jure Segregation  
The pinnacle of just how nadir the situation got for African-Americans during the end of 
the ninetieth-century, is best represented by the Plessy v. Ferguson case. The Plessy v. Ferguson 
case originated in 1892, when Homer Plessy – a man of Creole descent with fair skin – refused 
to sit in the “coloreds only” railroad car on the East Louisiana Railroad. Despite Plessy’s lighter 
completion, under Louisiana’s Separate Car Act,33 he was still considered colored and therefore 
required to sit in the colored railroad car. Plessy felt his civil rights, protected by the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendment, had been violated and he took his case to court. The case worked its 
way through the judicial system and made it to the United States Supreme Court in 1896. The 
U.S. Supreme Court did not give Homer Plessy the answer he was looking for, instead with a 7-1 
ruling, the court ruled against Plessy and thus so endorsed “separate but equal” facilities for 
African-Americans as the law of the land throughout the United States. Justice Henry Brown 
wrote the majority opinion for the Plessy case in which he stated: 
 
A statue which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored 
races -- has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races…the object 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality 
of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been 
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as 
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon 
terms unsatisfactory to either.34 
 
 
With the Courts ruling, Justice Brown and his fellow Supreme Court Justices (with the 
exception of lone dissenter Justice Harlan) – set judicial precedent for the continuation of de jure 
                                                        
33 Louisiana’s Act 11, also known as the Separate Car Act was passed in 1890 
(https://www.loc.gov/rr/news/topics/plessy.html). 
34 “Jim Crow Stories: Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).” PBS. Accessed December 13, 2015. 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/stories_events_plessy.html.  
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segregation. The precedent set by Plessy v. Ferguson would be felt throughout Washington, D.C. 
for fifty-eight years, from the cases decision in 1896 until 1954.  
By the turn of the twentieth-century Congress had reorganized Washington D.C.’s Board 
of Education, stripping much of the autonomy once held by the Board of Trustees for the black 
schools. With the loss of autonomy, black Washingtonians went from having a separate but 
fairly, well-managed black controlled, school system to a separate and drastically underfunded, 
under-resourced system in the hands of segregationalist white leaders. In 1902, forty years after 
the District of Columbia established separate schools for African-American students and six 
years after the Plessy v. Ferguson case, Washington, D.C. maintained only two public high 
schools for black students: The Armstrong Manual Training School – which was technical trade 
school that had just opened that year – and M Street High School [Dunbar High School], one of 
the most well-known and academically rigorous schools for African-American students in the 
early twentieth century.35 Whereas the District’s black students only had two public high 
schools, there were an abundance of public high schools for the District’s white students.  
President Wilson’s policies during his tenure between 1913-1921 further lead to the 
“sharp erosion of the Black community’s social, political and economic rights” in Washington 
D.C.36 Wilson authorized the reversal of the long-standing policy of racial integration in the 
federal civil service, which impacted the jobs and economic wellbeing of African-Americans 
who worked for the federal government. Additionally, in President Wilson’s first presidential 
term, he signed legislation that made interracial marriage a felony in the District of Columbia.  
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By the early 1950’s African-Americans made up more than a third of the District of 
Columbia’s eight hundred thousand people, with approximately 280,000 black people living in 
the city.37 The Great Migration drove scores of African-Americans, particularly those from the 
Deep South like Gardner Bishop, to seek a “better life” farther north, leading to a mass 
resettlement of Southern families in the District. Despite the surge in population, African-
Americans still struggled for equality and economic and social success in the District. 
Segregation permeated every aspect of life, not just education. Recreational facilities, restaurants 
and entertainment venues fell victim to vehemently segregationalist policies as well. For 
instance, the theater manager closed the National Theater – an American treasure of culture and 
the arts – for four years starting in 1948, rather than desegregating.38 When referring to 
Washington, D.C. in the 1950’s Peter Irons, states that “however cosmopolitan and polyglot the 
city may have looked and sounded, it was then very much a southern town.”39 
Segregation also infiltrated Washington, D.C.’s housing policy and urban planning, as a 
new kind of segregation, de facto segregation, pushed the majority of Washington, D.C.’s black 
population into the less developed, economically fragile areas of Northeast and Southeast D.C.40 
Housing in these two quadrants of the city consisted of tenements that were typically 
overcrowded and rundown.  The racial composition of neighborhoods in D.C. was deliberately 
crafted to segregate black residents into the most impoverished neighborhoods. For instance, 
federal mortgage loan programs administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
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Development (HUD), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) were implemented and 
managed in such a way that often barred blacks from purchasing homes in the suburbs.  
Common policy practices that kept black Washingtonians in poor neighborhoods, towards the 
center of the city, included denying construction permits and/or financing to African-American 
housing developments outside of the black zones and condemning black owned residential 
property for the “public good” (ie: for the construction of parks, highways, etc).41 The regressive 
policies that put a stranglehold on Washington D.C.’s black population in the first half of the 
twentieth century were just the beginning of the struggles for black Washingtonians.  
 
The Fight for the Schools 
In 1947 Gardner Bishop found himself growing increasingly frustrated over the fact that 
his middle school aged daughter Judine was one of the approximately 40,000 black school-aged 
children, who were subjected to crumbling school buildings, severely overcrowded campuses, 
inefficient curricula and going to school in part-time shifts on a daily basis.42 After living in D.C. 
for seventeen years and while Judine attended the particularly dilapidated Browne Junior High 
School, Bishop decided to harness the power of his fellow parents in the predominately black, 
Southeast Washington neighborhood of Anacostia. Bishop and his fellow parents officially 
formed the Consolidated Parent Group, Inc. in 1947. The Consolidated Parent’s Group central 
mission was to eradicate school segregation based on racial and socio-economic status in 
Washington D.C.43 By 1950, Bishop and the Consolidated Parent Group had initiated a major 
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court case, Bolling v. Sharpe, challenging school desegregation. In taking legal action against the 
District of Columbia Public Schools, the group aimed to use the courts as a last resort to integrate 
Washington, D.C. schools in order to provide black students with the educational opportunities 
that were equal to those of Washington’s white students. Assisting Bishop and the Consolidated 
Parent Group in their legal, political, and moral battle was a team of gifted, dedicated lawyers 
from Washington’s own Howard University School of Law – led by alumnae James Nabrit and 
George E.C. Hayes.  
In 1952 the group brought Bolling v. Sharpe to the Supreme Court, and in 1954 the court 
rendered their decision along the better-known Brown v. Board of Education case. Bolling v. 
Sharpe served as one of four companion cases to the larger Brown v. Board docket of cases. The 
other three school de-segregation cases that were simultaneously being heard and decided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court under the “Brown v. Board” umbrella were:  Briggs v. Elliot (filed in South 
Carolina), Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County (filed in Virginia), and 
Gebhart v. Belton (filed in Delaware).44 Yet, I argue that there were two major factors that set 
apart Washington’s Bolling v. Sharpe case from Brown v. Board of Education. Firstly, the 
Bolling case was a homegrown battle, birthed from the grassroots of Washington, D.C.’s black 
community. This community understood that D.C.’s standing, as a territory –and not a state – 
required a specific legal and community organizing expertise, strategy, and knowhow in order to 
successfully argue the Bolling case. Rather than relying on outside assistance from the NAACP 
to handle the case, as every other school desegregation case had, the necessity for local, 
grassroots organizing in Bolling v. Sharpe put the concerted work of the Consolidated Parent 
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Group and the lawyers from the Howard University School of Law at the forefront of the case. 
The Howard University lawyers capitalized on their familiarly with the landscape of 
Washington, D.C. Their arguments were based on D.C’s territoriality and the laws that governed 
it. This kind of argument was absent in the rest of the Brown v. Board cases since their path to 
desegregating schools relied on the Fourteenth’s Amendment’s equal protection clause (which 
applied explicitly to states only).   
Secondly, following the verdict of the Bolling v. Sharpe case, schools in Washington, 
D.C. “desegregated” at a faster pace than schools in the Deep South – Arkansas, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, etc. – impacted by the Brown v. Board decision. Both the favorable outcome of 
the Bolling v. Sharpe case, and the initial speed at which the D.C. Board of Education moved to 
“desegregate” schools fueled the cheers of victory from the larger civil rights community, as they 
believed that the intended impact of the Bolling v. Sharpe case was coming to fruition. However, 
the cheers of victory following the Bolling’s verdict were pre-mature. Following the immediate 
outcome of Bolling v. Sharpe D.C. schools began to move from de jure segregation, to de facto 
segregation, impeding the success of the District’s black students. Without addressing economic 
and social factors such as housing, employment, and political control that played into de facto 
segregation in Washington, D.C., African-American students could not have a truly equal 
education in terms of facilities, curriculum and teaching quality on par with their white peers. 
Bolling v. Sharpe did not account for these factors. The Bolling case did not bring equality to 
education in Washington, D.C., instead it put D.C.’s black students face to face with new 
challenges – challenges that were not so easily mitigated by education policy.  
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Chapter 1: Local Activism Sparks a Movement 
Between 1940 and 1950, Gardner Bishop, his Consolidated Parent Group, the Browne 
Junior High School PTA, and Howard University Law School lawyers strategically planned a 
series of legal and community actions in Washington, D.C. This activism helped them create a 
coalition of allies among black leaders and white citizens, and it became an instrumental 
component in bringing forth the Bolling v. Sharpe case. In 1941, parents within two community 
groups – the Northeast Boundary Citizens Association and the Capitol View Civic Association –
started raising concerns about the overcrowded, dilapidated schools that African-American 
students attended. Browne Junior High School, located in Northeast D.C., became a focal point 
of the debate over education conditions for African-American students. On February 19th, 1941 
during a school board meeting the Northeast Boundary Citizens Associated cited the crowded 
conditions at Browne Junior High School, and asked the school board for a new school facility 
that was capable of accommodating all of the students comfortably.45 A month later, the Capitol 
View Civic Associated followed suit, requesting that the school board build a new junior high 
school for the neighborhoods black students.46 Ultimately the requests of the community groups 
fell on deaf ears. Firstly, the school board refused to acknowledge that overcrowding was a 
problem for African-American students. Secondly, the outbreak of World War II led to a 
construction freeze, making it difficult to alleviate the Brown School student’s hardships over the 
next couple of years. 
It was not until after World War II, in 1947, when the controversy over Browne Junior 
High School reignited in the public eye. Gardner Bishop and the Consolidated Parents Group 
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took an active role in pushing for school equity for black and white students, as did the PTA 
leaders at Browne Junior High and larger community organizations such as the National Negro 
Council, who had the financial resources, media savvy and name recognition to help elevate the 
plight of the Districts Black students.47 The conditions in the black schools of Washington, D.C. 
in 1947 did not improve much since the issue was broached. More than forty percent of all 
classrooms in black elementary schools had classrooms with more than 40 students, while less 
than one of every hundred white classrooms was that crowded.48 A local newspaper reported the 
Browne Junior High School overcrowding, noting the school was over capacity by 790 
students.49 Black students all across Washington, D.C. were forced to go to school part-time as 
the Browne Junior High School had to take a double shift model to accommodate the mass of 
students. Other all-black schools in the District took, such as Cardozo High School, took on a 
more aggressive triple shift model to better accommodate their student bodies.50 Herbert Collins, 
a 1950 graduate of Cardozo High School, recalled his experience with attending school is such 
crowded conditions “We had 2,100 children in a school designed for 500. We had three shifts of 
students: a morning shift that came in at 8’oclock, a noon shift and then another shift at 2.”51 The 
overcrowding experiences Collins and his black classmates faced across the District can be 
attributed to the fact that the majority of African-American schools in D.C. were built prior to 
World War I, and a third of the buildings used were built before the Spanish-American War.  
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The school board crafted what they believed to be an acceptable solution to the 
overcrowding problem at Browne Junior High. They sent 1,223 black students from Browne to 
two former white elementary schools – the Blow school and the Webb school – which they then 
used as annexes for Browne.52 Yet this solution did little to pacify the angered black parents, 
students, and community leaders. In their eyes, the Board of Education had failed to provide 
equal facilities and equal opportunities for black students. Parents voiced their concerns that both 
the Blow and Webb school campuses lacked essential facilities necessary for the education of 
young adolescent students, including room for: art and music instruction, home economics, 
woodshop, printshop and metalshop.53  
Judine Bishop was a student among the all-black student body at Browne Junior High 
School in 1947. Her father, Gardner Bishop, had originally sought to have Judine attend another 
all-black public school the Banneker School – which had the reputation as the school for the 
children of lawyers, ministers and other black professionals. However the Banneker 
administration turned down Judine’s application citing her father’s barbershop as a business not 
prestigious enough for her to join the student body at Banneker. Bishop responded to this kind of 
class discrimination within the African-American community by forming the Consolidated 
Parents Group. He saw this organization as a counter space to the Browne PTA, which consisted  
“uppity negroes” who were “handpicked” and who frequently “passed over” the concerns of 
working-class black parents.54 By December of 1947 it was clear that the situation at Browne had 
become a full-blown crisis. The Consolidated Parents Group picketed and boycotted the school 
starting on December 3rd, effectively pulling their children out of Browne Junior High School.  
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In addition to the boycott, Bishop and the Consolidated Parents Group presented the D.C. Board 
of Education with a petition signed by one hundred and sixty people at a meeting noting that 
“these are children from Browne Junior High School and there’s not going to be – not one of 
them – or anyone else – at that school tomorrow, so I just wanted to explain who’s doin [sic] it 
and why”.55 His comment demonstrated that he was unafraid in his activism on behalf of the 
students, and he wanted that to be known. The petition cited the inadequacy of the Blow and 
Webb schools as solutions to the overcrowding, while focusing on the impact that segregated 
schooling had on the psyche and educational futures of the black students noting: 
The jeopardizing of educational growth, life, limb, emotional and physical health 
of pre-adolescent pupils through exposure to inadequate schooling facilities, 
traffic hazards, inclement weather and the temptation to skip classes, brought on 
by the daily changing to and from school buildings which are many blocks apart 
is unacceptable.56 
 
The petition also confronted the negligence displayed by the Board of Education regarding 
Browne Junior High School, noting that the entire board (with the exception of two members) 
had shown “total disregard for the will of the parents expressed through numerous telegrams, 
visits to public hearings and appeals to their representatives and civic organizations”.57 The fact 
that the majority of the D.C. school board had ignored the pleas of the parents only further 
worsened the situation, and went to prove that the culture within the leadership in DCPS 
propagated an ideology of indifference toward the black students of Washington. The Board of 
Education’s continued indifference and inaction caught the attention of the United States 
Congress as well. On December 17, 1947, Congressman Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois, who 
chaired the Committee on Washington, D.C. in the United States House of Representatives, 
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requested a complete and detailed statement “concerning the emergency problem which has 
arisen and been eventuated in the picketing of two schools.”58 With Congress taking note of the 
poor conditions faced by the all-black Browne Junior High School, the topic of de jure 
segregation in the nations capital’s schools had gone from a localized issue to a national eyesore. 
It was becoming more evident that “separate but equal” schooling was a false pretense and that 
the de jure segregation of students held serious consequences for the black students of 
Washington, D.C. 
At the same time that Gardner Bishop and the Consolidated Parents Group focused on 
community action strategies against segregation, the Browne Junior High School PTA took a 
more formalized legal approach to their attack on the subpar schooling conditions faced by 
African-American students. In October of 1947 the parents of Marguerite Carr, a young black 
girl at Browne Junior High School, brought forth a class action lawsuit on behalf of herself and 
“all other Negro children of school age of the District of Columbia” against the Superintendent 
of D.C. Public Schools, Dr. Corning; giving the case its name, Carr v. Corning.59 Carr v. 
Corning directly challenged the part-time schooling of African-American students at Browne. It 
sought to have Marguerite reassigned from the overcrowded Browne school, where conditions 
limited her to receiving only a part-time education, to the nearby and underutilized all-white 
school, Eliot Junior High School, where Marguerite would able to attend school full-time. 
Charles Houston, a former NAACP lead litigator and Dean of Howard University Law School, 
led the coordinated legal assault on D.C.’s segregated schools. Initially Gardner Bishop had no 
interest in filing a lawsuit alongside the Carr case to challenge the conditions that Judine faced. 
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Instead, Bishop wanted to continue with the Consolidated Parents Group’s picketing and 
boycotting of the school as their primary strategy towards achieving educational equity. 
However, as time went on the parents of the Consolidated Parents Group noted that a change in 
strategy was necessary if they would prevail in desegregating D.C.’s public schools. At the 
urging of fellow members in the Consolidated Parents Group and in the midst of the protests and 
boycotts, a reluctant Gardner Bishop met with Charles Houston at the end of December of 1947. 
Bishop was initially weary and suspicious of Houston and his motives since he viewed Houston 
as one of the “upper class Negroes” who disparaged and hurt the working class African-
American community.60 However, Gardner Bishop found that not to be the case at all; in fact 
Bishop later recalled that Houston was “elated” to meet with him – the leader of the strikers.61  
After the meeting, Gardner Bishop decided to file suit alongside the Carr v. Corning 
lawsuit and become a plaintiff. The trajectory of education history in Washington, D.C. was 
forever changed as a result of the meeting between Charles Houston and Gardner Bishop. 
Houston had successfully convinced Bishop to redirect his energy and activism toward the 
judicial system. Shortly after their meeting, Houston became gravely ill.62 Unfortunately, 
Houston would not live to see the full impact of his work; he passed away on April 22nd, 1950. 
Before passing Houston had taken the steps necessary to ensure his work would continue through 
another Howard educated lawyer, James Nabrit. Nabrit had established himself as a well-known 
litigator, teaching law at the Howard University School of Law. He was committed to the Carr 
                                                        
60 Daniel Hardin, “DC’s Fighting Barber & the end of public school segregation.” Washington Area Spark. 
Accessed December 1, 2015. https://washingtonspark.wordpress.com/2015/08/20/dcs-fighting-barber-the-end-of-
public-school-segregation/. 
61 Ibid., 
62 Houston passed away on April 22nd, 1950. 
   22
case, the accompanying school desegregation cases to Carr, and the larger scope of ensuring 
civil rights for the African-American students of Washington, D.C. 
In February of 1950 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia released their 
decision in the Carr v. Corning case. The court ruled in favor of the school board, handing down 
a 2-1 decision upholding de jure segregation in D.C. Public Schools. The court’s argument in 
Carr v. Corning was based on three premises. First, the court specified that an affidavit filed in 
District Court showed that as of February 16, 1948 no students were attending all-black junior 
high schools that were still on a double-shift schedule; as a school district, D.C. Public Schools 
asserted that they ended the double-shift model as of February 2, 1948.63 Since a large portion of 
Carr’s argument hinged on the fact that she was only able to attend school part-time because of 
the double-shift model, the affidavit served a huge blow to her case. Secondly, the court did not 
believe that the founding fathers of the United States had intended the Bill of Rights to be used in 
court to decide disputes over issues of race. Justice Elijah Barrett Prettyman wrote the decision 
and pointed to this reasoning, stating “We do not believe that the makers of the first ten 
Amendments in 1789 or of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 meant to foreclose legislative 
treatment of the problem in this country.”64 Further going on to write in the decision that “This is 
not to decry efforts to reach that state of common existence which is the obvious highest good in 
our concept of civilization…We must remember that on this particular point we are interpreting a 
constitution and not enacting a statute”.65 In taking such a stance, the justices took a more 
conservative, constitutional purist judicial route. They believed that deciding in favor of Carr and 
ruling that the schools must end de jure segregation would be overstepping their powers, making 
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them legislators rather than jurists whose role was to interpret the Constitutionality of a law. 
Thirdly, the justices argued that while yes it was true that the all-white Eliot Junior High School 
was underutilized and did have space available, there was not enough space available to transfer 
the complete excess of black students from the Browne school to Eliot; therefore they could not 
justify allowing Marguerite to attend the Eliot School. They pointed out that Eliot Junior High 
School had an enrollment of 771 pupils, while it had space for 918, “leaving an available space 
for only some 150 additional pupils; that it could not solve the overcrowding at Browne…”66 
Despite the court’s opinion, James Nabrit, Gardner Bishop, and advocates were not 
discouraged. They recognized that the Carr case laid an essential foundation for the continuation 
of their efforts to desegregate D.C.’s public schools. Carr v. Corning allowed black community 
leaders the chance to test the waters of the legal system as a means to desegregate D.C. Public 
Schools. Additionally, Carr v. Corning triggered Congress to order a thorough survey of D.C. 
Public Schools in July 1948, providing strong federal government sanctioned data to support a 
comeback lawsuit.   
 
The Strayer Report 
George Strayer was charged with compiling quantitative, statistical data to carrying out 
the comprehensive study of D.C. public schools. Strayer was a leading professor of education at 
Columbia’s Teachers College. He supervised the survey – known as the Strayer Report – 
overseeing a team of twenty-two researchers, professors, K-12 principals and school 
superintendents, in order to aggregate and interoperate the data.67 The overall purpose of the 
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report was to thoroughly examine the policies, hiring practices, curriculum, standards and 
building accommodations of D.C. Public Schools. In 980-pages, the Strayer Report unearthed 
the startling disparities between the educational experiences and facilities of white and black 
students in the District. Strayer and his team used a well-established system of evaluation, which 
had been used in thousands of schools nationwide, assigning an “Educational Adequacy Score” 
(EAS) to each of the school buildings in Washington, D.C. The highest possible EAS score a 
school could achieve was 1,000, however as Strayer noted, “None had ever been recorded as 
scoring 1,000 points and very few have scored as high as 900.”68 Most within the education 
community accepted that school buildings scoring 700 points or over were “in general very 
satisfactory schools.”69 Using the 1,000-point Educational Adequacy Score scale, Strayer 
concluded that Eastern High School – an all-white high school in DCPS – scored 764, while the 
all-black Cardozo High School, where Marguerite Carr attended following her time at Browne, 
scored a dismal 371.70 Cardozo High School’s 311 score put it on the edge as an unviable 
educational facility, as Strayer declared, “buildings scoring less than 300 points ordinarily do not 
justify heavy expenditures either in alteration, repair or addition,” because the buildings were so 
far gone.71  
The EAS scores of Cardozo and Eastern were just one bit of evidence the Strayer Report 
used to highlight the inequities facing black and white students throughout the D.C. school 
system. The report also took care to highlight the lag that black children faced in early childhood 
education (Kindergarten) in comparison to their white peers. The study also noted that teachers 
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in black schools were overworked and had to deal with larger class sizes then teachers in the all-
white schools. The report as a whole concluded that the conditions faced by black students did 
adversely impact their psyche and educational outcomes. Further, the report was a damning 
condemnation of Washington D.C.’s de jure segregated educational system. While the case 
findings were published after the Carr v. Corning proceedings, their 1949 release date allowed 
them to become a perfect aid to the efforts of advocates in the Bolling v. Sharpe case. When 
rendering the court’s ruling, the lone dissenter in the Carr v. Corning decision, Justice Henry 
White Edgerton of the United States District Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, used the 
evidence from Strayer Report as a valuable tool in understanding the realities faced by black 
students on a day-to-day basis. In his dissent of the Carr v. Corning case, Justice Edgerton 
stated, “Appellees contend the facts do not amount to denial of substantially equal schooling. 
The facts themselves are not in dispute. Those stated in the Strayer report are more recent and 
much fuller than those dealt with in the record and briefs, but do not differ from them materially 
in any other respect.”72 Justice Edgerton’s strategic use of the Strayer Report further highlighted 
its importance in advancing educational equity in Washington.  
The Strayer Report also triggered a rush by the U.S. Congress to appropriate additional 
funding to D.C. Public Schools, with a particular interest in building new schools in black 
neighborhoods. Congress’ appropriations bill provided federal funding for the District of 
Columbia to operate through June 30th, 1950 gave the District a total of $103,132,153 dollars. Of 
that allotment, $23,270,710 was dedicated to spending on the Districts public schools.73 A 
portion of the appropriations allotment was designated to construct Spingarn Senior High 
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School, an all-black high school in the Carver-Langston neighborhood, which became well 
known for producing basketball legends such as Elgin Baylor and Dave Bing. Congressional 
funds were not meant to desegregate schools. Rather, they were meant to placate the concerns of 
the city’s black community by providing them with a newer, more modern school facility. These 
intentions become most apparent in the fact that the appropriations stipulated that the money was 
designated for a black school in a predominately black neighborhood. This money provided 
evidence that schools in Washington would still be “black” or “white” but not integrated under 
Congress’ eyes. The funding to build Spingarn High School was a hot topic of debate for the 
1949 appropriations. The original House bill stripped the funding for the school, but the Senate 
reestablished funding for Spingarn, citing that the work to build the school “should proceed,”74 
Joel Elias Spingarn Senior High School opened in 1952. 
 
The Comeback Case 
  The decision in the Carr v. Corning case consigned Bishop’s son, Gardner Bishop Jr., to 
the still overcrowded all-black Browne Junior High School. To add insult to injury, while 
Bishop’s son was forced to travel across town from Southeast, D.C. to Northeast, D.C. to attend 
an inferior school, the school district opened a brand new whites-only high school directly in his 
neighborhood that fall in 1950 – John Phillip Sousa Junior High. Prior to its opening, the 
Consolidated Parents Group had unsuccessfully lobbied for John Phillip Sousa Junior High to be 
integrated. They argued that integration would have been an ideal option for black students, and 
that the campus facility could be used for both black and white students. The campus sat across 
from a beautiful golf course; it featured a spacious auditorium, a double gymnasium, a 
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playground with seven basketball courts, and a softball field. It had plenty of room and after the 
school opened, many classrooms sat empty.75 The Consolidated Parents Group argued that 
because the school had empty classrooms there was plenty of space for the black students in the 
neighborhood to attend. At the urging of attorney James Nabrit they filed a petition to the Board 
of Education on September 6, 1950, hoping to have the black students admitted to John Phillip 
Sousa. The petition citied two primary reasons why the school should be integrated: 
1) Sousa Jr. High can adequately offer Anacostia pupils a full Jr. High 
program (a) without additional costs for repairs, construction, etc. (b) Sousa 
Jr. High can serve all of the children and not be overcrowded, (c) facilities 
already paid for may then be put to full us; 2) We will not believe our 
Federal Government is so fraudulent as to indorse and enforce the policy 
you now maintain as to the dual system. (a) Note the change in national 
policy as to Armed Forces, swimming pools, Federal Parks, Federal 
Judgeships, U.N. delegates, (b) note the change in policy of the Recreation 
Board whose policy was originally copied after precedence established by 
the Board of Education.76 
 
In other words, the parents made a strong argument that desegregating John Philip Sousa 
would save the district money and follow national desegregation policies set forth by other 
federal agencies. Nevertheless, the Board of Education denied the petition. It remained staunch 
in its position that John Philip Sousa would and should remain a whites-only school.  The 
Consolidated Parent Group countered their decision by protesting a few days later on September 
11th, 1950. Gardner Bishop gathered a group of eleven African-American students, including his 
son, and marched to John Phillip Sousa High School demanding that the students be admitted to 
the school. The school denied Bishop’s request citing the students’ racial identity. However, the 
principal did give Bishop and the eleven students a tour of the school, offering them a close and 
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personal glimpse into their potential future. Later in his life Bishop recalled the impact that day 
had “Those Black children walked in there and they saw the most beautiful school they had ever 
seen. All those wonderful typewriters, the laboratories, the great gymnasium.”77 Both the 
school’s rejection and the campus tour put the wheels in motion for a subsequent lawsuit to Carr 
v. Corning against the School Board of Washington, D.C.  
 Just as was the case with Carr, the purpose of the lawsuit was to challenge the District’s 
de jure segregation policies. This time, though, the attorneys took a more aggressive strategy, 
highlighting the legal, moral and social deficiencies of the “separate but equal” standard. In 
December of 1952 – the same year Joel Elias Spingarn High School opened its doors to African-
American students – Washington D.C.’s segregated schools would again get there day in court. 
Bolling v. Sharpe became the comeback case. Bolling v. Sharpe received its name after the 
parents of twelve-year-old Spottswood T. Bolling Jr. who sued the President of the Board of 
Education, C. Melvin Sharpe, for racial discrimination. James Nabrit returned to advocate on 
behalf of Spottswood’s parents who were members of the Consolidated Parent Group, taking 
Bolling v. Sharpe to court with the experience of the Carr case still fresh in his memory. Serving 
as co-counsel, was George E.C. Hayes, an alumnus of the famed M Street High School.78 While 
Bolling v. Sharpe, and the remaining four cases that made up the Brown docket, fought back 
against the “separate but equal” precedent established by Plessy v. Ferguson, there was a major 
difference between the Brown of Kansas, Virginia, South Carolina and Delaware and the 
District’s, Bolling v. Sharpe. The Brown umbrella of Virginia, Kansas, South Carolina and 
Delaware argued against the constitutionality of “separate but equal” schools for African-
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American students using the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, while the Bolling case 
relied on the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment’s stance on “liberty” to justify ending the 
segregation of Washington D.C. public schools.79 The Fourteenth Amendment’s strict language 
addressed the states and the states only, and because Washington, D.C. was a territory of the 
United States and not a state, the Brown V. Board ruling of Kansas, Virginia, South Carolina and 
Delaware had no stand-alone legal bearing on the de jure segregation of schools in Washington 
D.C. Bolling v. Sharpe became a legal necessity if de jure segregation was to be overturned in 
the schools of the nation’s capital.  
Nabrit knew not to pursue the legal argument that the Fourteenth Amendment afforded 
the African-American students of D.C. Instead he attacked the de jure segregation policies using 
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, arguing that: “the educational rights which petitioners 
assert are fundamental rights protected by the due-process clause of the Fifth Amendment from 
unreasonable and arbitrary restrictions.”80 Ultimately, by bringing the Bolling v. Sharpe case 
forth in the court system, civil rights leaders in the District were determined to integrate 
Washington D.C.’s public schools. Before Bolling v. Sharpe could get to the docket of the U.S. 
Supreme Court with the other Brown umbrella cases, it had to go through the lower appellate 
courts. Bolling was originally argued in April 1951 in U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia. Judge Walter Bastian dismissed the case, citing the fact that “separate but equal” was 
still the law of the land, as upheld by Plessy v. Ferguson and most recently in the specific context 
of D.C.’s schools, Carr v. Corning. Therefore, Bastian contended that there was nothing illegal 
about what the D.C. public schools were doing in maintaining two separate school systems based 
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on race. Despite dismissing the case, Judge Bastian did have an accurate premonition about the 
importance of the Bolling v. Sharpe case, stating that “an important and significant point has 
been raised and this case will ultimately make history.”81 Nabrit and Hayes then prepared to 
appeal their case to the Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, before finding out 
in October 1952 that the U.S. Supreme Court justices wanted to add the case to the docket 
putting it under the Brown umbrella. With that order, Nabrit and Hayes could bypass the lengthy 
appeals process in the lower courts, and move Bolling v. Sharpe from the U.S. District Court to 
the United States Supreme Court building. With its the grandiose pillars of power, the Supreme 
Court stood just over a mile away from the rundown all-black Shaw Junior High School where 
young Spottswood attended. It was here where the fate of Washington D.C.’s black students 
would finally be decided.  
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Chapter 2: Bolling v. Sharpe, the Arguments and a Decision 
On December 8th, 1953 Spottswood Bolling, the additional students involved in the 
Bolling v. Sharpe case, and thousands of the other black students in D.C. Public Schools were 
still attending Shaw Junior High, and the other segregated, poorly equipped all-black schools in 
DCPS. Inside the United States Supreme Court that day, the two men representing the 
disenfranchised black students of Washington – James Nabrit and George E.C. Hayes – reignited 
their vigorous fight to protect what they believed to be the Constitutional rights of D.C.’s 
African-American students. The two attorneys argued that continued systemic, legalized 
segregation – particularly in reference to education – was relegating African-Americans in the 
District of Columbia to the status of “second-class citizen,” forcing them to suffer all types of 
“civil disabilities” imposed on them by segregationalist policies.82 On the other side of the aisle, 
the D.C. Board of Education retained Milton D. Korman to represent them, and argue for the 
continuation of school segregation. Chief Justice Warren sat at the center of the Court, with his 
fellow jurists: Hugo L. Black, Stanley F. Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, Robert H. 
Jackson, Harold H. Burton, Thomas C. Clark and Sherman Minton.  
When Bolling v. Sharpe first made its way to the Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl 
Warren was a fairly new jurist. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had appointed him to the bench 
just months earlier in October of 1953. Prior to his appointment Warren served as the Governor 
of California, being popular amongst conservatives and liberals alike. He had won numerous 
gubernatorial elections “with strong backing from registered Democrats who predominate in his 
state” allowing him to hold his seat in the governor’s mansion for three terms.83 In the Bolling v. 
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Sharpe case, Warren’s ability to bring people from different viewpoints together would prove 
critical in securing a favorable result for the black students of Washington, D.C. His role in 
procuring a unanimous decision in this and the other Brown cases earned him the title of “friend 
of social progress.”84  
When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Nabrit and Hayes were fully prepared to 
put forth a strong case. They had worked alongside fellow Howard University School of Law 
faculty members for months to construct a strong legal strategy. Their strategy was two-pronged 
approach that legally questioned the segregationalist education policies of the District. The first 
central point to Nabrit and Hayes’s legal argument was that black students of Washington, D.C. 
had the Fifth Amendment on their side, which protected their rights to liberty and due process. 
The second major point of their argument was that Washington D.C.’s standing as the beacon of 
freedom throughout the United States and the world was incompatible with the school board’s 
policy of segregation based on nothing else but race. These two arguments bolstered the case of 
Spotswood Bolling and the Consolidated Parent Group over the two-day course of re-arguments 
that took place in December 1953. 
 
The Fifth versus the Fourteenth Amendment  
Hayes and Nabrit began their legal arguments in the Supreme Court by positioning 
the plight of the black students of D.C. as one that was different from the plight of other black 
students across the country. Their argument rested on the Districts unique position as a territory 
under federal control. Hayes established this crucial distinction early in his opening statements, 
noting on December 8th, 1953: “The problems that we face are problems which are different 
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from those which the Court has been hearing for the past two days; different because of the fact 
of our federal relationship; different because of the fact that there are no state-federal 
conflicts.”85 Hayes allusion to the two days of hearing was a reference to the Brown v. Board of 
Education case concerning Virginia, Delaware, Kansas and South Carolina. Hayes and Nabrit 
knew that in order to win their case they had to differentiate Bolling from Brown by emphasizing 
why black students in D.C. needed specific protections that Brown v. Board could not afford 
since the Fourteenth Amendment applied to states and not D.C. proper. George E.C. Hayes 
continued to demarcate his argument from that of Brown’s by relentlessly emphasizing the 
importance of the Fifth Amendment “I do not need to say to this Court that we are not concerned 
primarily with the Fourteenth Amendment. We rely rather upon the Fifth Amendment because of 
the fact that that applies to our jurisdiction.”86 Hayes also noted that his use of the Fifth 
Amendment centered on the amendment’s language specific to life, liberty, and due process. The 
amendment specifically notes that no person “shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of the law;”87 Nabrit and Hayes used this clause as the crux of their legal 
case, asserting that segregation in D.C. public schools was unconstitutional as it denied black 
students their rights to due process and deprived black students of liberty. In court, both Hayes 
and Nabrit carefully crafted their arguments to center on the importance of the Fifth Amendment 
noting in the December 8th arguments that “segregation per se is unconstitutional, and that 
without regard to physical facilities, without regard to the question of curriculum and that if, as a 
matter of fact, there is a designation that one must go to a particular school for no other reason 
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than because of race and color, that is a violation of the constitutional right.”88  Using the Fifth 
Amendment to validate their arguments also meant that James Nabrit could argue that Bolling v. 
Sharpe was about “the Federal Government dealing with Federal citizens.”89 This defense 
centered on the fact that the black students of Washington D.C. had a constitutional right to the 
full protection of federal law, and that required that they attend equal, non-segregated schools in 
a federal territory.  
 
 
The Cold War & The Larger Implications of Segregation in Washington  
In addition to their Fifth Amendment argument, Nabrit and Hayes’s emphasized that 
Washington D.C.’s standing as an international symbol of power and liberty was not compatible 
with upholding segregation in the District’s schools. They argued that continued segregation was 
not just detrimental to domestic affairs, but international affairs as well. Their argument was 
particularly judicious given that Bolling was heard during the peak of the Cold War. During the 
Cold War, the United States sparred with the Soviet Union for economic, technological, and 
perhaps most importantly political supremacy. However, segregation of black and white citizens, 
particularly in schools – given the high visibility of public education on the world stage and the 
value placed on education in society – put a blemish on the reputation and strength of American 
democracy. The United States’ continual segregationalist policies became an easy target for 
Soviet propaganda machines to lock in on, and the Soviet Union strategically used American 
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racial tensions and Jim Crow inspired laws to conjure rallying cries against American 
democracy. A story in the Soviet Literary Gazette titled “The Tragedy of Coloured America” 
illustrates how the Soviet propaganda machine capitalized on segregation: 
It is a country within a country. Coloured America is not allowed to mix with the 
other white America, it exists within it like the yolk in the white of an egg. Or, to 
be more exact, like a gigantic ghetto. The Walls of this ghetto are invisible but 
they are nonetheless indestructible. They are placed within cities where the 
Negroes live in special quarters, in buses where the Negroes are assigned only the 
back seats, in hairdressers where they have special chairs.90 
 
 President Eisenhower’s administration fully recognized that school segregation only fueled the 
flames of Soviet propaganda, such as the above excerpt from the Soviet Literary Gazette. A 
report produced by Eisenhower’s Presidential Committee on Civil Rights cited this concern 
several times. The report stated that the segregation of D.C. Public Schools was one reason why 
the District of Columbia was “a graphic illustration of a failure of democracy,” and stated that 
“racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubts 
even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.”91   
Politicians in the United States positioned the Cold War as classic “war” of good-versus-
evil – with the United States and democracy representing the good, and the Soviet Union and 
Communism representing the evil. The story of Bolling v. Sharpe was a story about progress and 
social change, and was the kind of story that fit into the good (desegregation) overcoming evil 
(segregation) framework that was beneficial to the United States in their political propaganda 
battle with the Soviet Union. Historian Mary Dudziak stresses the connection between the Cold 
War and the school de-segregation cases of Bolling and Brown noting “Brown powerfully 
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reinforced the story of race and democracy that had already been told in U.S. propaganda: 
American democracy enabled social change and was based on principles of justice and 
equality.”92 In order for the United States to mark their political supremacy and strike back, they 
needed a win in the Bolling v. Sharpe case to flaunt the merits of democracy, over what the 
Soviet Union saw as the merits of communism.  
Nabrit and Hayes took advantage of this necessity, and the ever-looming background of 
the Cold War, which crept its way closer to the forefront of the case. Washington D.C. was a 
place where other nations, people, and diplomatic leaders looked to for the foundation of 
democracy. It was the place where the Soviet’s were looking at as well, for more opportunities to 
eviscerate the United States. James Nabrit reiterated this matter in his December 8th arguments 
declaring, “Here we are dealing with the capital of the free world.”93  Washington, D.C.’s 
standing as “the capital of the free world” meant that the city held a higher position as a 
cosmopolitan city than Topeka, Kansas – where the Brown v. Board case originated. This 
juxtaposition of D.C. as both the center of democracy and de jure segregation for black and 
white students became a jarring reality to comprehend. The juxtaposition was not lost on United 
States Attorney General Hebert Brownell Jr., who in an Amicus Curiae (friend of the court brief) 
submitted for all of the public school segregation cases, described the problem in the District as 
“particularly acute.” Brownell’s Amicus Curiae also emphasized the important role of the city as 
“the window through which the world looks into our house…the seat of the Federal 
government,” pointing out that President Eisenhower had commented that “The District of 
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Columbia should be a true symbol of American freedom and democracy for our own people, and 
for the people of the world.”94 Hayes harnessed this powerful juxtaposition, along with the stance 
of the Attorney General and President Eisenhower’s Committee on Civil Rights, to play to the 
advantage of the black students, announcing to the court in his opening arguments on the eighth 
of December: 
The world at large is waiting to see what this Court will do as far as the District of 
Columbia is concerned, to determine as to whether or not the Government of the 
United States will say to these petitioners, if they are not entitled to the same 
liberties as other persons, that they are denied it simply because of their race and 
color.95    
 
The world was waiting to see if the District of Columbia, if nine Supreme Court Judges, and if 
the United States Constitution would come together and grant the right to access an desegregated 
education to black students in D.C. public schools. 
 
For the District: Mr. Korman 
Attorney Milton D. Korman – who represented the District of Columbia schools – was 
the primary person in the court standing in the way of Bolling v. Sharpe being decided in favor 
of the respondents (Nabrit and Hayes, the black students, and the Consolidated Parent Group). 
On December 8th 1953, after the statements of Mr. Nabrit and Mr. Hayes, Korman proceeded to 
lie out why D.C. public schools should remain segregated. Korman argued that Congress had 
already legislated on the issue of school desegregation in the District of Columbia, and many 
times over had decided to stay the course with segregated schools as the lawful solution. In his 
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opening arguments Korman noted, “That it is still the policy of the Congress to maintain separate 
schools for the races in the District of Columbia, and we are here to defend the validity and the 
constitutionality of those laws.”96 Korman also argued that the Supreme Court was not the 
appropriate venue for the conversation of school desegregation, stating, “I stand before the Court 
to assert that this is not the forum wherein laws should be attacked because change is wanted.”97 
To Korman and the District, Spotswood Bolling, his fellow students and the many parents and 
community members that rallied around them were simply barking up the wrong tree: Congress 
had spoken, now was not the time for de jure segregation to end. Despite the conviction of his 
arguments during parts of his defense, Korman and the District of Columbia presented a shoddy 
case in defense of their “separate but equal” policy. Korman consistently seemed uncertain about 
the validity of the arguments he was presenting to the justices. This uncertainty shined through 
his discourse in the courtroom, as he noted “it appears that they [the laws] are still valid.”98 He 
was unable to discern whether or not the laws were still valid, as his use of the words “it 
appears” implies. Korman’s legal argument was so jointed that the justices of the court were 
confused and in a state of confusion as to why Korman was even there. Early in his proceedings, 
when responding to a question posed by Justice Frankfurter, Korman clarified that he spoke for 
“the Board of Education of the District, although I admit very frankly in our brief that I have not 
talked to the individual members so far as their position on the sociological issue is concerned.”99  
Korman had not communicated with D.C. Board of Education members in order to ascertain 
their stances school desegregation. To add insult to injury, Korman admitted that some members 
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of the Board of Education, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, and other government 
officials had publicly called for the end de jure segregation in D.C. public schools. 
Nabrit and Hayes built a strong case based in historical and legal precedent, in the 
experiences of black students in D.C. public schools, and with the robust support of community 
groups such as the Consolidated Parent Group. Alternatively, Korman and the D.C. Board of 
Education did not  know who in their group supported segregation, and furthermore they could 
not explain the reasons behind why supporters of segregation did support the policy. Another 
problem that plagued Korman’s legal argument was that high amount of turnover that occurred 
in the D.C. Board of Education. This rapid turnover of board members created a large mass of 
confusion. Out of the nine members from the 1950 Board of Education, only Mr. Sharpe 
remained as an original member by December 8th, 1953. Justice Hugo Black inquired about the 
change in personnel on the Board and how it impacted the case. Towards the end of the day’s 
arguments, Justice Black asked Mr. Korman “Will you let us know in the morning when the case 
comes up, whether the Board wants you to defend this case? It has raised some questions in my 
mind and I think – 100“ Korman cut the Justice off before he could finish but the message had 
been made clear: the Justices of the Supreme Court were unsure as to if this case even warranted 
a defense by the District. At 4:30 PM on December 8, 1953 the court recessed, to reconvene the 
next day. That day in court had rendered undeniable damage to the District’s case for continuing 
de jure segregation.  Not only was Korman’s time in front of the Justices a confusing 
continuation of blunders, James Nabrit took advantage of his closing arguments to drive home a 
powerful and resounding message of desegregation: “We submit to you that in this case, in the 
heart of the nation’s capital, in the capital democracy, in the capital of the free world there is no 
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place for a segregated school system. This country cannot afford it, and the Constitution does not 
permit it, and the statues of Congress do not authorize it.”101 Nabrit’s closing arguments, which 
strongly hammered home the importance of democracy and freedom in the nation’s capital,  
solidified the strong case they had built in favor of Gardner Bishop,  Spottswood T. Bolling Jr., 
and all the black students of D.C 
 
“It’s not over yet”  
Finally, on May 17th, 1954 at 1:20 PM – five months after the final re-arguments of 
Bolling – the Supreme Court released its decisions on the Brown v. Board case and the Bolling v. 
Sharpe case.  The court had ruled unanimously in both the Brown and the Bolling case in favor 
of ending de jure segregation in public schools. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority 
opinion in the Bolling v. Sharpe case. Warren’s opinion reflected the success of Nabrit’s and 
Hayes’ two central argument. He noted that the Fifth Amendment did protect the black students 
of Washington D.C. from facing segregation and that the segregation of D.C. Public Schools was 
incompatible with the standing of Washington as a symbol of justice and freedom. The Bolling 
opinion also tied in the Brown v. Board of education case and the Fourteenth Amendment – 
symbolizing the importance of all of the education cases being decided on the same day. The 
outcome in the Brown case added substance to Warren’s majority opinion, as he opened his 
opinion explaining the critical link:  
We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools. The legal 
problem of the District of Columbia is somewhat different, however. The Fifth 
Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal 
protection clause, as does the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies only to the states. 
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But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American 
ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive102  
 
Chief Justice Warren agreed that the Fifth Amendment should be the primary basis for the courts 
decision, but he also saw how the Fourteenth Amendment could bolster the courts legal 
argument and strengthen the protections for the black students of D.C. The Warren opinion in 
Bolling v. Sharpe clarified that “classifications based solely on race must be scrutinized with 
particular care” given that they were “contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally 
suspect.”103 Nabrit and Hayes used their legal prowess to meet the threshold of legal proof 
necessary to warrant Chief Justice Warren’s further emphasis of the Fifth Amendment and its 
legal standing on the case, as he stated in the opinion: “Segregation in public education is not 
reasonably related to any proper government objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of 
the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes and arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in 
violation of the Due Process clause.”104  The opinion concluded with what civil rights leaders 
hoped would be the final nail in de jure segregation’s coffin: “We hold that racial segregation in 
the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by 
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.”105  The Warren opinion made it clear that the U.S. 
Constitution prohibited not just the states, but also and the federal government, from maintaining 
racially segregated school districts.  
The Courts decision in Bolling v. Sharpe and Warren’s direct and succinct opinion had 
given Gardner Bishop, James Nabrit, George E.C. Hayes, and the working-class parents of the 
Consolidated Parent Group their long sought after “victory.” The decision was even more 
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impressive than the other Brown because it was a homegrown victory, achieved with little to no 
outside help. The Consolidated Parent Group and the lawyers from Howard Law worked 
together strategically to procure the verdict in favor of the students. This unprecedented success 
made Bolling v. Sharpe the only major school case decided without counsel from the NAACP.106  
The majority of civil rights community leaders were assured that with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bolling v. Sharpe segregation had seen its final days in the schools of the District of 
Columbia. This sentiment was widely held throughout the Washington, DC area, as a 
Washington Post article published the day after the decision, on May 18, 1954 titled “ ‘Separate 
but Equal’ Doctrine is Thrown Out Historic Opinion on Cases in D.C., VA, 3 States are 
Unanimous” highlighted the importance of the case and the rousing since of satisfaction felt by 
advocates in favor of the ruling: “In some quarters, the decisions were being hailed as the most 
important on racial relations since the Supreme Court ruled before the Civil War that Dred Scott, 
a Negro slave, was not a citizen…”107 Current Washington, D.C. Congresswoman Eleanor 
Holmes Norton – who was a junior at Dunbar High School, at the conclusion of the Bolling case, 
and a member of the last all-black graduating class – recounted to her biographer that she 
remember “believing that the world had changed, literally had changed” after her principle had 
announced the news about the case over the loudspeaker.108 Following the cases ruling, Gardner 
Bishop stepped down as the President of the Consolidated Parent Group. He returned full time to 
running his barber shop.109  
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 In the moments after the Supreme Court announced the decision in the Bolling and 
Brown cases, Howard University law students and community member’s swarmed James 
Nabrit’s office.  In an enthralled state of elation the students and residents tirelessly clamored for 
a copy of the decision. Nabrit stood and recited the decision line-by-line, as the crowd listened in 
awe. Many in the room listening to Nabrit’s deep southern drawl readout the decision believed 
their day of justice had come. Dovey Roundtree, a law student of Nabrit’s, recalled that day, “In 
my mind, it was the legal case of the century, something that could just shatter the whole of 
segregation with one great blow.”110 Dovey was not alone in holding this opinion. The clearly 
defined legal specifications outlined in the opinion were perceived as a victory for civil rights 
and African-American students in the District. However, the undertaking of truly desegregating 
Washington, D.C. schools was more complex than most people could have imagined at the time. 
Before Nabrit departed his office for the day, he left the law students and community activists 
who were basking in the milestone decision that they had just witnessed – and for many taken 
part in – with one phrase: “It’s not over yet.” These four words alluded to the battle for the 
education of the District’s Negro children that was yet to come.  
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“The world has no time for the childhoods of black boys and girls. How could the schools?” 
-Ta-Nehisi Coates 
 
Chapter 3: The Negro Children 
The challenge with implementing school-based policy is that school district 
administrators have their own biased, interpretation of the law. These biases cause a schism 
between the intended outcomes of the law and the actual impact of the law. The aftermath of the 
Bolling v. Sharpe decision could not avoid this tried and true dilemma. The ruling called for 
black and white students to attend school together for the first time in the one hundred and fifty-
two year history of K-12 public education in Washington, D.C.111 However progressive and 
groundbreaking the notion of reversing a century and a half old pattern of injustice was, the 
vague wording of Chief Justice Earl Warren’s U.S. Supreme Court decision left a wide spectrum 
of interpretation as to what “integration” meant. To some parents, community leaders, and 
advocates, integration meant having racially balanced schools that had a population of fifty 
percent African-American students and fifty percent white students in the same school. To 
Superintendent Hobart M. Corning and Assistant Superintendent Dr. Carl F. Hansen, a school 
was successfully integrated if there was one white student, and two hundred African-American 
students (or vice versa). Hansen and Corning’s definition of successful integration disregarded 
the ratio of black to white students in individual schools and across the school district as a whole. 
All that mattered to Hansen and Corning was that any number of black and white students were 
going to same school.  
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The debate between defining “integration” was just one of many that loomed in the 
background of Bolling v. Sharpe’s implementation in the months, and years, following the May 
17th, 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision. In this chapter I will demonstrate the shortcomings of 
the initial Corning plan to desegregate D.C.’s public schools, and argue that Hansen’s latter 
tracking plan was veiled in racist, white-savior, beliefs that Negro students suffered from 
“continued, persistent, average academic retardation.”112 I will then go on to demonstrate how 
Corning and Hansen’s policies collided with a second mass migration of black Southerners to 
Washington, D.C. driving “white flight” – seeing tens of thousands of white residents flee 
Washington for the suburbs of Virginia and Maryland. The combination of Corning’s 
shortsighted desegregation plan, the policies of his successor Carl F. Hansen – particularly 
academic tracking – and white flight led to de-facto segregation. These factors ravaged the urban 
education system in Washington, D.C., re-segregating D.C. Public Schools.  
 
The Corning Plan 
The District of Columbia Public Schools worked hastily to comply with the court’s ruling 
in the Bolling v. Sharpe case. . Superintendent Hobart M. Corning, who had been at the center of 
the aforementioned Carr v. Corning lawsuit prior to the Bolling case, took on the responsibility 
of executing the implementation of the decision. Eight days after the ruling, on May 25th, 1954, 
Corning presented the desegregation plan to the D.C. Board of Education for approval.113  
Corning’s blueprint would appropriately go on to be known nationally as “The Corning Plan.”114 
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It prioritized finding a pragmatic balance between redrawing school zone lines and allowing 
children to stay in their existing schools. Assistant School Superintendent Dr. Carl F. Hansen 
collaborated with Corning in creating and overseeing the implementation of the desegregation 
plan. Hansen, Corning, and their colleagues wanted to integrate schools with minimal distraction 
or incident. They were adamantly against dramatically disrupting the neighborhood school 
system and opposed any kind of forced bussing that would challenge the sanctity of 
neighborhood schools. Carl F. Hansen later recalled that “In staff discussions several of us 
strongly urged ‘Keep this issues simple. Avoid arousing objections to desegregation by forcing 
children to leave their schools. Create no secondary parental antagonisms.”115 In order to avoid 
“parental antagonism,” the plan functioned under three basic principles: allowing current 
students to finish school where they were, placing new students in their newly defined 
neighborhood school, and integrating teachers regardless of race into previously all-black and 
all-white classrooms. On June 2, 1954 the School Board approved the plan almost as fast as it 
was presented to them, putting the wheels in motion for D.C. Public Schools to open on an 
integrated basis for the upcoming fall.116  
The pace at which the Washington D.C. School Board devised their plan to end de jure 
segregation was astounding, particularly in comparison to the pace that school districts in the 
Deep South worked to do the same. Much of the Deep South resisted the Brown ruling using the 
convenient phrase in the decision “with all deliberate speed” to justify delaying and impeding the 
process of integrating schools.117  However, in Washington, government officials and school 
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leaders did the opposite – working to ensure a quick implementation of the Bolling decision. 
Superintendent Corning made speedy implementation of Bolling, declaring, “Complete 
desegregation of all schools is to be accomplished with the least possible delay,” with the 
ultimate goal of achieving “full desegregation” by September of 1955.118 There are two primary 
reasons why D.C. schools worked to implement their version of desegregation at such a rapid 
pace. First, the Superintendent’s office had anticipated the decision in the Bolling v. Sharpe case 
for quite some time, making steady preparations to end de jure segregation in schools as early as 
1952. Superintendent Corning took several early steps to prepare the school district for 
integration including the creation of “Brotherhood Week” in January of 1952—a series of events 
and lectures meant to encourage racial bonding—and request to use the “Handbook of Intergroup 
Education” in April of 1952.119 Secondly, schools in Washington, D.C. implemented the Corning 
Plan quickly because they faced added pressure from the federal government to do so. The White 
House held a stake in the pace at which D.C. schools desegregated, as Presidential Press 
Secretary James C. Hagerty declared that President Eisenhower desired to rid the District of all 
shreds of racial segregation, presumably as fast as possible.120 DCPS could not ignore pressure 
from the White House and this undoubtedly contributed to the speed at which public schools 
worked to comply with the Bolling v. Sharpe decision. 
The Corning Plan commenced its crucible of implementation on the first day of fall 
classes – September 13, 1954 – also known as “D-day”, for Desegregation Day.121 Parents, 
teachers, and administrators believed that D-day would mark a new era in Washington D.C. 
Public Schools; an era of integrated, equal schools for both white and black students. Dr. Carl 
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Hansen had high hopes for the integration of D.C.’s Public Schools, desegregating the District’s 
schools had been one of his primary objectives since arriving in Washington.122 Speaking 
afterwards on the topic of school desegregation at an education conference in Nashville, 
Tennessee, Hansen stated “one of the great values…of desegregation in Washington is what I 
would call a unification of the school system;” he saw the court ordered desegregation of 
Washington’s schools as an opportunity to bring together the messy conglomerates of 
paperwork, administrative responsibilities and funding streams between the two separate, all-
black and all-white school systems.123 The first day of classes went off with little incident, 
seemingly lighting the path for the “unification” Hansen spoke of, and playing into the belief that 
a new and improved era for DCPS was beginning. School board officials, especially Hansen, 
boasted that virtually overnight D.C. Public Schools went from a school district strictly divided 
by the color line, to a school district where black and white pupils attended class together in 
seventy three percent of the schools.124  
Certain schools, such as McKinley High School, were deemed exceptional stories of 
success that displayed the undoubted achievement of integration. On the first day of classes, the 
previously all-white McKinley High School opened with a student body comprised of five 
hundred and eighty-eight white and three hundred and forty-five Negro students, representing 
one of the more racially balanced student bodies in DCPS.125  The media shared the sentiment 
that integration was successful as well. All across the District newspaper headlines touted what 
an immense accomplishment the first day of integration in D.C. Public Schools had been; A 
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Washington Post headline read “Integrated D.C. Schools Enjoy Calm Opening Day”, and the 
Washington Star ran a headline “Racial Integration in Schools Goes Smoothly on the First 
Day.”126 Even President Eisenhower seemed pleased with how smoothly the first day of 
integration went, sending a message from Denver to Washington on September 15, 1954: “I am 
happy to have your favorable report on the District’s opening school day with mixed classes and 
faculties. I feel certain it will continue to run smoothly.”127  All signs pointed to progress in 
Washington.  
However, upon closer examination, it was clear that in many of the seventy three percent 
of schools that were “integrated,” minimal integration had actually taken place. Several 
“formerly” white high schools had Negro memberships of twelve or less pupils on the first day 
of school, the five vocational high schools remained segregated according to a September 14th 
report, twenty-six elementary schools remained segregated, as did seven junior high schools.128  
The minimal integration in some schools and the outright continued complete segregation in 
others did not go unnoticed. Members of the civil rights community and black parents clamored 
that the Corning Plan did not do enough in the immediate aftermath of Bolling to alleviate one 
hundred plus years of segregation. The Negro Federation of Civic Associations was particularly 
vocal on the implementation of the Corning Plan, publicly objecting to the desegregation 
schedule, and several black parents demanded that their kids be transferred immediately from 
“formerly” all-black schools to “formerly” all-white schools, which afforded students better 
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facilities and in many cases were closer to home.129 Moreover, President Eisenhower’s “feeling” 
that integration would continue to run smoothly did not hold true.  
After the initial success of opening day September 1954, the realities of the challenges 
began to settle in. White students and parents staged walkouts across DCPS starting on October 
4, 1954 and white students at Eastern High School, Chamberlain Vocational High School, 
McFarland and Taft Junior high schools and McKinley High School – the school that had just 
weeks earlier been praised for creating a racially balanced environment – staged protests and 
walkouts publicly denouncing integrated schools.130 At the peak of the protests, some 2,500 
white junior and senior high school students were voluntarily kept out of school because of the 
walkouts and protests.131 White parents also publicly voiced their concerns to Dr. Hansen about 
their students being in classrooms that remained predominately black; one parent protested  
I don’t object to integrated schools. I’ve attended them myself. But my little girl is the 
only white child in her class and all of the teachers and the principal in the school are 
Negro, and she doesn’t feel comfortable although everyone is nice to her.132  
 
This particular complaint highlighted how African-American students were not the only ones 
who faced discrimination and backlash in light of integration; angered white parents also 
targeted African-American educators and administrators. On October 20, 1954 a group of 
seventeen white parents attended the D.C. Board of Education meeting objecting to the recent 
assignment of black teachers to a formerly all-white school that remained predominately white. 
The parents charged that having black teachers in a formerly all-white school “will eventually be 
detrimental to the entire teaching staff” and “would lower the quality of our schools.”133 The 
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walkouts and boycotts by white students lasted one week, and ultimately the protests of the white 
parents did not keep black teachers from teaching white students. However, the protests did 
reinforce the idea that African-American students and educators were detrimental to the wider 
public education system in Washington, D.C.   
Despite the turbulent 1954 school year, implementation of the Corning Plan continued. 
Staying true to their desired goal and original timeline, the school board reported in the fall of 
1955 that as of October 21st, eight-seven percent of DCPS schools had racially-mixed student 
bodies, and 92,273 pupils attended schools classified as desegregated.134 The tempestuous course 
of desegregation did not stop Hansen from staunchly defending the status of D.C.’s Public 
Schools as being integrated. After the declaration of “complete integration,” Hansen asserted “To 
some earnest people, integration means that there must be intermixing in every school. If it falls 
short of that, the school system is not completely integrated and the evils of Jim Crowism are 
preserved.”135 This statement further buttressed that Hansen’s definition of desegregation 
neglected to acknowledge the proportion of black students versus white students in a school and 
was therefore shortsighted.  Instead, it had been decided that the statistics justified the 
declaration of segregation being officially over. 
 The illusion of a just and equal school system for African-American and white students 
was born. African-Americans continued to be an undesirable population in the schools of the 
very city that they had built, because the school district remained entrenched in the ideology that 
a high quality public education was designated for white students only. The Corning Plan did not 
change the fact that the intellect, abilities, and human rights of African-American students was 
still devalued and ignored. White school leaders, such as Dr. Hansen, made sure that 
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predominately black schools, in predominately black neighborhoods, still had inadequate 
facilities and resources in comparison to predominately white schools in Washington, D.C. The 
continued, dramatic racial imbalances in schools that were supposedly “desegregated,” and the 
continued under-resourcing and under-funding of predominately black schools kept African-
Americans relegated to a second-class education even after the implementation of the Corning 
Plan. 
 
Debunking “The Miracle of Social Adjustment,” Hansen’s Tenure, and De facto Segregation 
Representative James Davis of Georgia, and a faction of Congressmen mostly from other 
states in the Deep South, initiated a Congressional hearing to examine how Washington, D.C. 
had rapidly ended de jure segregation in schools.136 Dr. Hansen sat before Congress on 
September 27th, 1956, defending the decision to end de jure segregation after Congressmen 
Davis had publicly lambasted school desegregation in Washington, stating that it had “seriously 
damaged the public school system.”137 Yet again, the District of Columbia’s complicated 
relationship with the federal government was put into the spotlight, and education was at the 
center of it all.  During Hansen’s testimony, Congressmen John Bell Williams of Mississippi 
looked at him and asked, “Do you think Mr. Hansen that integration in the District of Columbia 
Schools has been carried on smoothly and without incident?” Hansen replied, “It would be 
fantastic to say ‘without incident’ I think that the integration program in this city has been a 
miracle of social adjustment.”138 That response launched the myth of the “Miracle of Social 
Adjustment,” a myth that would evolve into the defining tagline of the first twenty years of 
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integration in Washington, D.C. public schools, and would define characteristics of Carl 
Hansen’s tenure as Superintendent when he took over for Hobart Corning in 1958.139 Hansen 
defined the Miracle of Social Adjustment, as “people activating and being activated by the social 
change we call integration,” further elaborating in his book that the miracle he spoke of was 
centered on “the accommodation to rapid desegregation by over 100,000 pupils and the adults 
associated with them, by more than 5,000 staff, by scores of citizens’ groups was unprecedented 
in the annals of social revolution.”140 The Miracle of Social Adjustment was the manifestation of 
Hansen’s white savior, color-blind, ideology which hindered his ability to comprehend the full 
spectrum of unjust realities that continued to deny African-American students access to equal 
education.  
 Dr. Christopher Emdin, a scholar and professor at Columbia University’s Teachers 
College notes that “The narrative itself [the white savior narrative], it exotic-izes youth and 
positions them as automatically broken,” noting that  “a savior complex gives mostly white 
teachers in minority and urban communities a false sense of saving kids.”141 Throughout his 
tenure Carl Hansen exoticized black students in the ways that Emdin references, and Hansen’s 
white-savior complex manifested itself during his tenure as Superintendent in Washington, D.C. 
in several instances. Hansen embodied an archetypal white savior because he believed that 
African-American student’s struggles in schools had to do with their supposed “severe learning 
difficulties,” noting that they lacked background experience and information on the larger world 
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outside of school, or outside their impoverished “ghetto” neighborhoods.142 Hansen also believed 
that African-American students and educators were “burdened” by their race and noted that he 
made the decision early on “perhaps to soothe my conscience” that that he would do everything 
he could to promote desegregation in Washington.143His mission to “desegregate” schools was 
more about making himself feel good about “doing the right thing” than it was about actually 
helping the black children of Washington, D.C.  
Hansen also perpetuated a color-blind ideology that dictated his education policy, and 
was a direct conflict of interest with his alleged goal to fully desegregate D.C. public schools. In 
Danger in Washington Hansen wrote, “My view, admittedly sociologically unsophisticated, is 
simply that children are in school to be taught. Though they come in assorted sizes, shapes, and 
colors, they have one thing in common, the hope to mean something not only to themselves but 
also to others. What then does race really have to do with the children in our schools? Or 
anywhere else, for the matter?”144 Hansen could not genuinely work for racial equality in schools 
because he failed to see race as a factor in the education of children, and he ignored the lasting 
impact of hundreds of years of institutionalized racism. While it may seem that Hansen had the 
genuine best interest of African-American students in mind with his desire to end segregation, 
the policies he implemented and his plans said otherwise. He often disregarded the critiques of 
groups like the NAACP and the National Urban League, calling proposals brought forth by the 
Urban League to create more racially balanced schools “unrealistic,”145 and referring to leaders 
in the black community as “militant civil rightists.”146  He went as far to dismiss the entirety of 
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the civil rights movement and their goals writing “I believe race will not be the telling factor as 
time goes on, and the current babble about Negro rights will soon be judged as sounding brass 
with no truth in its voice,”147 further exhibiting his color-blind beliefs.  
A February 1957 Time Magazine article endorsed Hansen’s “miracle” using similar 
idealistic language in the title: “The Miracle on the Potomac.” The article praised Hansen’s work 
to “integrate” the schools, providing examples of integration being successful, stating, “Perhaps 
the best illustration of how integration is working in Washington lies in dozens of anecdotes 
cited by Hansen.”148 
One such anecdote involved a group of boys at a junior high school:  
In a junior high school, a group of boys decided to join an anti-integration demonstration 
going on in front of their school. But on the way outside the building, they passed a 
Negro classmate, promptly proved that they had actually accepted integration without 
knowing it. "Hey, you," shouted a white boy at the Negro, "come on!" "Who—me?" 
asked the startled Negro. "Yes, you!" said the white boy. "You're one of us, aren't 
you?"149 
 
This example, and other anecdotes provided by Hansen to support his claim that the Miracle of 
Social Adjustment was in-fact a miracle, and that integration was going well in Washington only 
acknowledged what was happening on the micro level, as Hansen hoped to use a few positive 
stories to paint a broader brush of success across DCPS. What Hansen’s and Time’s “Miracle” 
neglected to acknowledge was the macro level realities of structural racism, discrimination and 
poverty that the “The Miracle of Social Adjustment” did not address. The Miracle of Social 
Adjustment as a whole failed to recognize that began thriving in Washington, D.C. schools post-
Bolling. Political Scientist Jeffrey Henig notes in his 1997 report Patterns of School-Level Racial 
                                                        
147 Ibid., 75. 
148  “Education: Miracle on the Potomac,” Time Magazine, February 25, 1957, 
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,936858,00.html. 
149 Ibid.,  
   56
Change in D.C. in The Wake of Brown: Perceptual Legacies of Desegregation that “While called 
a ‘miracle’ by some…The District’s school integration process occurred during a period of 
steady transition to an all-black school system,” Henig’s statement further supports the notion 
that the implementation of the Corning Plan did not end segregation in D.C. Public Schools; it 
merely ended the formalized practice of de jure segregation in D.C. Public Schools.150 The 
Corning Plan’s failed to take into account the impact white-flight would have on further 
exacerbating the racial divide in D.C. Public Schools. Furthermore, Dr. Hansen’s education 
policy, specifically his controversial academic tracking plan led to the transition from de jure 
segregation to de facto segregation in DCPS.  
Hansen continued perpetuating the idea of the Miracle of Social Adjustment. In a 1957 
report titled, The Miracle of Social Adjustment – Desegregation In The Washington, D.C. 
Schools, he proclaimed, “In the District of Columbia no child is denied admission to any public 
school or to any group within that school because of race”.151 However, students were still 
denied admission to public schools based on race and assigned to particular schools based on 
race; the reasoning was just no longer a codified law that required specifically having “all-black” 
and “all-white” schools. Instead de facto segregation dictated school assignment. Dr. Hansen’s 
neighborhood school system and the neighborhood lines still denied African-American students  
denied admission to any public school of their choosing. Washington neighborhoods are either 
predominately black or predominately white, with Rock Creek Park serving as a divider. The 
phrase “west of the park” refers to the white neighborhoods to the west – Northwest Washington 
– while anything “East of the River” is known as the all-black neighborhoods in the far corners 
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of Northeast and Southeast Washington that are home to the city’s poorest residents and lowest 
achieving schools.152 These strict neighborhood divides carved the path to de facto segregation, 
and were established during period of white flight that occurred in the latter part of the 1950’s 
through the 1970’s.  
White flight is a socio-economic occurrence that is characterized by large masses of 
white residents – who are typically middle class/upper-middle class – fleeing the city and 
heading to suburban areas outside the city center. In Washington, white flight manifested itself in 
such a way that created a prototypical black versus white dichotomy, with a “chocolate city” and  
“vanilla suburbs”.153 The creation of this prototypical dichotomy was enabled by Washington, 
D.C.’s geography, as it is a particularly well-situated breeding ground for white flight to occur, 
due to its nearly equidistant location between Maryland and Virginia. Suburbs in Northern 
Virginia, which were generally five to fifteen miles away, such as Alexandria, Arlington and 
Fairfax all made for ideal locations for families to settle; while in Maryland areas such as Chevy 
Chase, Bethesda, and Rockville became popular amongst fleeing white families.  
Washington, D.C. based education professors Rona Frederick and Jenice View argue that 
racism, class animosity, suburbanization, equal opportunity housing laws, urban renewal, 
poverty, the growing pains of the new local government and general social unrest created 
instability in the schools.154 I add to that argument that the very factors View and Frederick cite, 
as listed above, also encouraged white flight, and that it is no coincidence that the circumstances 
that led to school instability also led to white flight because the two are inextricably linked. 
Between 1950 and 1960, a second mass migration of African-Americans coming from the South 
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to Washington occurred, as a result the number of blacks in Washington increased from 284,313 
to 411,737.155 Simultaneously the number of whites living in D.C. fell dramatically from 518,00 
to 352,00.156 In the context of the schools during a similar time frame research from Henig, 
Frederick and View along with data sets from D.C. Public Schools demonstrates that within a 
decade of the Bolling v. Sharpe decision D.C. Public Schools became a school system with 
nearly an all-black student enrollment. In 1964, there were 115,000 black students enrolled in 
D.C. Public Schools and only 18,000 white students, a startling difference from 1954 when there 
were approximately 35,000 white students enrolled and 60,000 black students enrolled.157 The 
impact of the drastic drop in white enrollment paired with the drastic rise in black enrollment 
played out in schools everywhere across the District. One white Washington parent wrote a letter 
to Superintendent Hansen in mid-April of 1965 stating her frustration with the fact that her white 
daughter was part of a very small group of white students at her local school. She chastised 
Hansen for “letting the whites move out of her neighborhood” and firmly asked Hansen if her 
daughter could transfer to an “all-white” school.158 She stated, “You could hardly call a school 
integrated when the student body is 85 percent Negro and 15 per cent white.”159 Her request to 
transfer her daughter to an “all-white” school was denied. Just one year later, her family joined 
the ranks of those who she had previously disparaged for moving out of the neighborhood, as 
there was a story in the newspaper profiling that the family had moved to Maryland in an area 
with “few if any negro residents.”160 The families move to Maryland in order to shelter their 
daughter from having to attend school with Negro students embodied the very definition of white 
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flight, and demonstrated the clear link between white flight and the racial makeup of schools in 
Washington.  
This dynamic of white flight precipitating de facto segregation was not just isolated to 
this lone incident. Just four years after integration at McKinley High School, a previous “model” 
of the success of integration that had a nearly equal number of white and black students by the 
end of the school year in 1954, there were 1,375 black students and 114 students according to a 
school report. By 1964 – ten years after the schools supposed integration – there were only nine 
white students. Integration at McKinley High was dead.161 The story of McKinley became the 
story of the vast majority of the schools in the District. Jeffrey Henig reports that by 1960 Turner 
Elementary, which sat “east of the river” in Southeast Washington, had only 18 white students 
out of a total 848 students.162 Giddings Elementary, which was also located in Southeast D.C., 
never fell below 86% black and by 1960 only had 47 white students.163 The statistics that told the 
stories of Giddings, McKinley and Turner were indicative of a larger problem, as nearly two-
thirds of all formerly all-white schools experienced abrupt and dramatic racial turnover, and the 
remaining one third previously all-white schools – most of which were located in middle class to 
upper middle class Northwest D.C. neighborhoods such as Tenleytown and Friendship Heights – 
still averaged less than five-percent black enrollment by 1956 and less than twelve-percent black 
enrollment in 1960.164 Within six years of the Bolling decision the small number of remaining 
predominately white schools “had become sharply distinguished from the rest,” given their 
location in de facto segregated, nearly all-white neighborhoods and the significantly high number 
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of white instructional staff who clung on to the small enclave of city classrooms environments 
that mirrored those in the vanilla suburbs. This elite subset of schools that emerged by the early 
1960’s played into the sentiment of urban, black schools being “inferior,” and schools made up 
primarily of white and middle class students being labeled as “superior.” This dynamic embodied 
the same characteristics and same social and academic consequences for black students of the de 
jure segregated “all-white” and “all-black” schools that Gardner Bishop faced in 1940’s and 
1950’s. The re-creation of this racially coated binary of “inferior” versus “superior” schools is a 
testament to the shortcomings of the Bolling v. Sharpe decision. 
Educators in the District were cognizant of the fact that de facto segregation was carving 
out an elite subset of all-white schools, and that schools still had little to no racial balance among 
the study body. They responded to the crisis of de facto segregation. In July of 1963 a group of 
ten D.C. teachers, who had participated in a month long conference on school desegregation 
problems at the Bank Street College of New York City, returned to Washington and presented a 
proposal to the School Board. The proposal presented four primary points to shift racially 
skewed enrollments and provide more balance to the system. The plan called for students from 
predominately white and predominately black schools to be exchanged, and also called for 
teachers to be exchanged in order to create more racially balanced classrooms. The plan also 
proposed more culturally relevant curriculum to be taught in classrooms in order to “reflect the 
multi-racial character of American life” as opposed to continuing to teach the “middle-class, 
white Protestant culture and life.”165 The most radical component of the plan went directly 
against one of Hansen’s biggest educational cornerstones and beliefs – keeping neighborhood 
schools, strictly neighborhood schools – calling for school boundary zones to be re-drawn with 
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the explicit goal of “bringing about more integration;” the plan charged that left as is the school 
zone boundaries “perpetuated segregation.”166 The teacher’s idea to re-draw school zone lines 
provided a concrete solution to begin reversing the damage that had been done by de facto 
segregation. Hansen however rejected the plan proposed by the teachers, asserting he would 
under no circumstances entertain the idea of intentionally re-drawing school zones in order to 
achieve more of a racial balance, continuing the believe that the Miracle of Social Adjustment 
needed no adjustment itself.  
Despite the overwhelming evidence and statistics that disproved Hansen’s assertion that 
student’s race did not impact their ability to enroll in any public school or group within that 
school Hansen refused to accept the possibility that the Miracle of Social Adjustment was not 
such a miracle after all. In fact Dr. Hansen did not even believe de facto segregation existed or 
impacted students educational or life outcomes.  Hansen later wrote in Danger in Washington 
that de facto segregation was nothing more than “a vague concept, lacking in clear outline.”167 
He went a step further too even call de facto segregation “a social myth” and “a costly and 
unprofitable distraction.” 168 Unfortunately for the black students of Washington, D.C. – who did 
hold Hansen’s privilege of being able to evade the outcomes of de facto segregation – the impact 
of such segregation was felt in the classroom, and only further exacerbated by academic tracking.   
 
Jim Crow Reborn: De Facto Segregation Meets Academic Tracking 
Carl F. Hansen’s educational philosophy was completely focused around the premise of 
academic tracking. He saw tracking as not only the crux of fair, morally strong education, but 
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also as the crux of democracy, and as the only way to protect America’s workforce and future 
from mediocrity, citing “the anti-grouping tradition” implies that “our democracy can never rise 
higher than the level of its average citizen.”169 When he served as Assistant Superintendent for 
Senior High Schools, Hansen implemented the tracking system for the District’s senior high 
schools in 1956.170 By 1959, he pushed to implement the tracking system in all of DCPS, 
including elementary and middle schools.  Academic tracking divided students in two ways; 
physically by taking students in the same school building and strictly separating them into four 
different parts of the building based on their “academic level,” and secondly it separated students 
emotionally/socially, by recreating the notion of superior and inferior students. Tracking students 
meant putting them into one of four educational tracks: basic/remedial, general, college 
preparatory and honors. The “basic track” was designated for “the mentally subnormal pupils, 
who are identified by such measures as intelligence and achievement test and teachers 
opinion”.171 The “regular track” was classified as “a program for the great majority of students 
who work at about the proper grade level and show no unusual problems in motivation and/or 
adjustment”; while the “Honors track” was designated for students whose IQ surpassed 120 and 
who learned “rapidly” and “easily.”172 
African-American students were typically classified as “mentally subnormal pupils,” and 
as a result were put on the basic track. This practice further associated whiteness with superiority 
and blackness with inferiority. This is not surprising, given the fact that on numerous occasions, 
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Hansen referred to the “persistent average academic retardation of the Negro”173 and he also 
accused Negro administrators during the days of de jure segregation of avoiding giving their 
students standardized tests in fear that “gathering data that might prove embarrassing.”174 The 
implementation of the educational tracking was designed to “avoid racial mixing within the 
schools” and was a new way to reconceptualize racial segregation. Academic tracking intensified 
the impact of de facto segregation. Because not only was de facto segregation happening outside 
with the school buildings and neighborhoods, but now also within the schools the black and 
white students that did go to school together were further separated on their campuses. In April 
of 1965, after the school board decided to amend the tracking system rather than get rid of it, 
school board member Mordecai Johnson shared his frustration and beliefs about the real 
intentions of the tracking system, noting that Negro residents of Washington feared the 
segregation that was implicit in the track system: “This Board maintains as much of a segregated 
system as it can possibly do without admitting it publicly.”175 Johnson was not the only Board 
member who charged that tracking was another tool of segregation, Euphemia L. Haynes also 
shared that sentiment and put fourth several proposals throughout her time on the school board to 
repeal the tracking plan. By the end of 1965 more controversy erupted over the tracking plan 
when in December the New York Times reported that after facing immense questioning from the 
African-American community, D.C. school authorities admitted that tracking had led to the 
wrong placement of hundreds of pupils, “whose chances in school and life thus far were in 
danger of being permanently crippled.”176 Educational tracking was proving to be an unjust 
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detriment to African-American children, and it was permanently crippling not just the black 
students themselves, but the entirety of the D.C. public schools system.  
 
Education Goes to Court Again: Hobson v. Hansen 
In 1967 the journey of D.C. Public Schools came full circle, as the D.C. Board of 
Education once again found themselves in court, defending a policy that the likes of Euphemia 
L. Haynes, Mordecai Johnson, the Urban League and many others believed promoted racial 
segregation. After nearly ten years of controversy and protest, Superintendent Hansen’s tracking 
policy followed the paths of Carr v. Corning, and Bolling v. Sharpe into the courtroom. The 
Hobson v. Hansen case was born. Civil Rights leader Julius Hobson filed the suit, alleging that 
low-income and black students were denied equal educational opportunity as a result of the 
tracking systems well-documented discriminatory practices.177 There were many similarities 
between Gardner Bishop and Julius Hobson. Hobson was also a parent, which inspired him to 
fight for civil rights with a specific focus on educational inequality. Hobson frequently walked 
his son passed the all-white school in his neighborhood on their way to the all-black Slowe 
Elementary School in Northeast, D.C, and having to walk his son past the all-white school 
inspired Hobson to fight for civil rights.178 Also like Bishop, Hobson also faced immense 
criticism for his work and beliefs. This was especially true during the duration of the Hobson v. 
Hansen case. A June 1967 Washington Post article described Hobson as a militant, free-lance 
civil rights activist; “Julius W. Hobson stands for controversy and militancy in both Negro and 
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white communities in Washington.”179 One reason why he was accused of militancy was because 
he was a strong believer in civil disobedience and organized boycotts, school walkouts and 
protests. One such boycott was set for “May Day,” May 1, 1967. Hobson set a goal for 5,000-
10,000 students to sit out of school to show their support to end once and for all the tracking 
plan. The May Day walkout was controversial, to the extent that the local D.C. chapter of the 
NAACP disavowed Hobson’s plan, as did hundreds of Baptist preachers around Washington, 
D.C. who encouraged parents to still send their children to school that day.180 Hobson did not let 
the opposition stop him and the May Day walkout went as planned. Although it did not draw the 
tens of thousands of protesters Hobson hoped for, it did further establish Hobson’s commitment 
to securing justice for D.C.’s black students by any means necessary. This militant spirit served 
him well over the course of the 18-month case that ensued, to decide whether or not the tracking 
system would remain in place as is, or whether it was indeed another instrument of racial 
segregation, and would be abolished immediately. The man at the head of the court charged with 
making that decision was Circuit Judge Skelly Wright. Judge Wright heard the case in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia in the summer of 1967.  Superintendent Hansen 
disliked Judge Skelly Wright with a fervent passion. In his book Hansen caustically stated, “The 
people who say that God is dead are wrong. He is currently sitting on the Federal Bench in 
Washington, D.C. His name is J. Skelly Wright.”181 Hansen also had little respect for Julius 
Hobson, describing him as a “Negro civil rights agitator.”182 The Hobson v. Hansen case was 
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about ensuring that African-American students had access to the high quality of education that 
the Bolling v. Sharpe had not only promised them, but also had legally guaranteed them.  
Before the case came to be, and throughout the duration of the case, Carl Hansen 
consistently maintained the tracking system had nothing to do with race, and was simply about 
separating pupils “according to their own abilities into specific programs of study.”183 He even 
went as fare to create and compile a forty-two-page report on academic tracking, which he 
presented to the School Board in 1964. Hansen continued his pattern of defending tracking by 
writing an article titled A Defense of the Track System, where he again reiterated, “the main 
purpose of the track system is to increase the teachability of classes.”184 Unfortunately for 
Hansen, his strong convictions that there was nothing morally, socially or legally unjust about 
the tracking system did not hold up in court.  
In a scathing 183-page decision handed down on June 19th, 1967 Judge Skelly Wright 
dismantled every single argument Hansen presented on the merits of keeping the tracking 
system. Judge Wright ruled in favor of Julius Hobson and African-American students of 
Washington, D.C, in what would go on to be known as “The Wright Decision.” Judge Wright 
called the tracking system “criminal.” He ordered the immediate end of the tracking system.185 
The language in the Hobson v. Hansen decision was much stronger and much more prescriptive 
than the language in the Bolling v. Sharpe decision. The decision called for the immediate end of 
the tracking system in D.C. Public Schools. Judge Wright did not dance around the fact that the 
tracking system upheld segregation and was detrimental to African-American students. Two 
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major points of the decision in particular sent a clear message to Hansen and the D.C. Board of 
Education that tracking had to go. First, Judge Wright wrote, “Adherence to the neighborhood 
school policy by the School Board effectively segregates the Negro and the poor children from 
the white and the more affluent children in most of the District's public schools.”186 This 
conclusion from Judge Wright again disproved Hansen’s “Miracle of Social Adjustment,” 
providing further evidence to support that it was a myth. Judge Wright’s statement also 
supported the conclusion that de facto segregation had indeed ravaged D.C. Public Schools. 
Judge Wright’s also raised the point that: 
The aptitude tests used to assign children to the various tracks are standardized primarily 
on white middle class children. Since these tests do not relate to the Negro and 
disadvantaged child, track assignment based on such tests relegates Negro and 
disadvantaged children to the lower tracks from which, because of the reduced curricula 
and the absence of adequate remedial and compensatory education, as well as continued 
inappropriate testing, the chance of escape is remote.187 
 
This assertion by Judge Wright strategically picked apart Hansen’s long held assertion that 
tracking had nothing to do with race. In the decision of Hobson v. Hansen, Judge Skully Wright 
peeled back the façade that tracking was about improving “teachability” and revealed the racist 
layers of Hansen’s policy.  
Carl F. Hansen was beside himself after the Hobson v. Hansen case. His pride and joy – 
the tracking system – had been ruled against in the court of law. Following Judge Wright’s 
verdict there was discussion amongst the school board members about whether or not they would 
appeal the decision in order to continue tracking and delay any possible implementation of the 
Wright Decision. Hansen had the Corporations Counsel office look into whether or not there was 
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any legal ground for the D.C. Board of Education to file an appeal. Counsel did find an 
opportunity to appeal but by then the majority of the Board of Education had decided they 
wanted to no part of an appeal to the Wright Decision.188 Headlines ran in the local papers on 
July 2nd declaring HANSEN IS REBUKED- “HE WILL RESIGN” SCHOOL BOARD 
FORBIDS APPEAL OF HOBSON SUIT and HANSEN GIVEN ULTIMATUM. BOARD 
INSISTS HE NOT APPEAL SCHOOL RULING.189 The next day, on July 3, 1967, 
Superintendent, Dr. Carl F. Hansen – the man who coined the supposed desegregation of D.C. 
Public Schools a “Miracle of Social Adjustment,” and who touted his role in ending de jure 
segregation – resigned, because whether or not he wanted to admit it D.C. public schools 
remained segregated, and his tracking plan played a major role in the continued segregation. In 
his farewell press conference Hansen stated, “The Board of Education, by a majority vote has 
ordered me not to appeal the decision in the Hobson v. Hansen case. This action in effect orders 
my dismissal from the school system. This is so because my refusal to accept this order places 
me in direct insubordination in relation to my employers.”190 With the Hobson v. Hansen ruling, 
and Hansen stepping down – ending his reign over DCPS – the path seemed clear for the full 
promises Bolling v. Sharpe to come to fruition: educational equity for black and white students, 
and the end of segregated schools, once and for all.  
 
 
  
 
 
                                                        
188 Hansen, Danger in Washington: The Story of My Twenty Years in the Public Schools in the Nation’s Capital. 
224-225. 
189 Ibid,.227. 
190 Ibid., 228. 
   69
Conclusion: The Unfinished Legacy of Bolling v. Sharpe 
 
This historical analysis has delineated the history of segregation, and racial inequality in 
Washington, D.C. public schools, from 1800 through the late 1960’s, looking at the issues from 
the prospective of the people who lived the struggle for justice. This analysis has also 
demonstrated the inextricable link between race and education in the District of Columbia, 
arguing that this link originated with the black codes of the early 1800’s, which disallowed 
African-Americans the opportunity to access public education. The link between race and 
educational outcomes in D.C. continued throughout history, manifesting itself into 
Superintendent Carl F. Hansen’s tracking policy, which disproportionally placed African-
American students on slower academic tracks than their white peers. Everyday African-
American’s who were parents, young people, lawyers and community leaders such as William 
Syphax, Gardner Bishop, Spottswood T. Bolling, James Nabrit and Julius Hobson became 
community change agents, leading the charge for equality in education for all African-Americans 
across the District. Going back to the nineteenth century, the black community in Washington, 
D.C. and their small – but strong – band of white allies, fought injustice at every turn, using 
ingenious community organizing and legal techniques to push back against racist policies and 
unfavorable administrators. It started with the construction of the Bell School by black carpenter 
George Bell in 1807, and William Syphax putting together the first publically funded black 
educational institutions in the District of Columbia during the nineteenth century. The fight for 
equality in schools then evolved into Charles Hamilton Houston mentoring James Nabrit and 
Gardner Bishop, bringing fourth the Carr v. Corning case. Carr v. Corning was a necessary 
precursor to Bolling v. Sharpe, as it served the legal test case to set up Bolling.  
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Additionally, I have argued that the Bolling v. Sharpe case was the focal point of D.C. 
education history. As a case, it set out to end, and ultimately did end, the practice of de jure 
segregation in Washington D.C. Public Schools – aiming to provide the promise and opportunity 
of an equal education for the District’s black and white students. The case set itself apart from 
the rest of the Brown v. Board of Education litigation because of its grassroots, local origins led 
by Gardner Bishop and the Consolidated Parent Group, along with the cases reliance on the Fifth 
Amendment. The Bolling v. Sharpe case was legally more innovative, and also a more 
challenging case to argue in the U.S. Supreme Court than the other Brown v. Board of Education 
cases because James Nabrit and George E.C. Hayes, the lawyers who argued Bolling, did not 
have the luxury of using the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause to base their 
arguments on. Instead, they hinged their entire legal strategy in Bolling v. Sharpe on the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment, arguing that DCPS was denying African-American 
students their right to liberty and due process by refusing them access to schools that were 
designated as all-white. These all-white schools were far superior to the all-black schools, as the 
same Jim Crow laws oppressed African-American residents in Washington, D.C. as they did 
African-American’s living in the Deep South. To combat Jim Crow, de jure segregation, Nabrit 
and Hayes presented a radical and audacious legal argument – challenging conceptions about the 
definition of “liberty,” in order to press forward the basic civil rights of African-American 
students. I also have argued that the Bolling v. Sharpe case is even more momentous when it is 
considered that the case was argued and won from a legal standpoint without the help of the 
NAACP or any other outside litigators. The lawyers at the Howard University School of Law, 
and local D.C. activists who worked alongside Gardner Bishop cultivated the support necessary 
to ensure a favorable legal outcome.  
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Finally, the central argument I make is that despite the perceived victory that was sensed by 
civil rights leaders on May 17th, 1954 when Chief Justice Earl Warren declared that the 
continued de jure segregation of schools in Washington, D.C. was unconstitutional and did 
violate African-American students protected Fifth Amendment Rights, the full promises of the 
Bolling v. Sharpe case have yet to come to fruition. The only promises that have come to fruition 
from the Bolling v. Sharpe case is the ringing of James Nabrit’s eerily prophetic words “Its not 
over yet,” as Nabrit sensed the case was not the comprehensive answer that D.C.’s black 
residents were searching for. Nabrit was right, as the Bolling decision itself did not create equal 
access toe education for black students, instead it facilitated the shift from de jure segregation to 
de facto segregation, and African-American students remained locked out of a high quality 
education. De facto segregation of D.C. Public Schools was brought on by white flight and 
socio-economic shifts in D.C. proper, as white families fled to the suburbs of Maryland and 
Virginia leaving a rapidly deteriorating urban center and a school district in transition. The 
Bolling v. Sharpe case, and the latter Corning Plan, which was meant to supposedly desegregate 
schools, did not take into account the impact that de facto segregation would have on the schools, 
leaving nearly impossible expectations for the Bolling v. Sharpe case to fulfill.  
Following the Bolling v. Sharpe decision, the tenure of Superintendent Carl F. Hansen 
complicated matters for African-American students, and delayed the Bolling decisions promises 
coming to light. Hansen’s academic tracking policies further segregated black and white 
students, subjecting African-Americans to an inferior education once more. The 1967 decision in 
Hobson v. Hansen, “The Wright Decision,” ended the formalized tracking system once and for 
all. It was the ideal companion case to bolster the strength of the Bolling decision, in order to 
hasten the coming of educational equity for African-Americans in D.C. However the Wright 
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Decision only succeeded in expelling Carl F. Hansen from D.C. Public Schools, it has not 
ultimately succeeded in providing black students with equitable and just educational 
opportunities in the District.  
Through my analysis I have concluded that the decision in the Bolling v. Sharpe case was a 
victory for the optics of the civil rights movement, as it did send a message that the courts were 
willing to stand for justice. However, sixty-two years later the legacy of the decision still remains 
unfulfilled. With that I have also concluded that de facto segregation post-Bolling and Hobsen 
was just as detrimental to the learning outcomes and opportunities for the District’s black 
students, as de jure segregation was. The issue of education and race remains relevant and 
important today in Washington, D.C and other major urban centers that face the dilemmas of 
white-flight, socio-economic inequalities crumbling infrastructures. This analysis leaves room 
for further research to be done on the implications of both the Bolling v. Sharpe and Hobson v. 
Hansen cases in D.C. Public Schools going into the late twentieth-century and the twenty-first 
century thus far, to further examine why African-American students still do not typically have 
the same access to resources or high-quality education as their white peers. There is also room 
for further research to look at why Washington, D.C. remains a city that is highly segregated, 
with black and white residents and students staunchly separated by neighborhood divides. It is 
clear that the fight for educational equality in the District of Columbia did not stop with the 
Gardner Bishop and Bolling v. Sharpe. 
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